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1. Introduction 
The spatial allocation of economic activities is crucial for productive and allocative efficiency. 
As evidence of this, eighty percent of the US population now lives in cities. These cities occupy 
only two percent of the nation’s land but its occupants produce a disproportionate share of its 
output and virtually all of its innovations. However, urban life also imposes hefty costs on its 
inhabitants in the form of more expensive dwellings, longer and more congested commutes or 
higher crime and poverty rates. Many of these costs and benefits like agglomeration economies 
are not priced by the market. Hence, the equilibrium outcome of individual location decisions 
will normally be inefficient.1 
In principle, land use regulations can correct the positive and negative externalities associated 
with urbanization by separating (or mixing) land uses, altering population density or limiting city 
size. They can – through zoning – also ensure the provision of local public goods such as public 
parks. Land use regulations thus potentially have an important role to play to correct market 
failure, achieve efficiency and raise real incomes.2  
Recent evidence for the US and the UK, however, casts some doubt on the proposition that 
existing forms of land use regulation are efficient. This evidence highlights the enormous gross 
costs of land use regulations in metro areas such as New York, San Francisco or London (Glaeser 
et al. 2005a, Cheshire and Hilber 2008). In these places, tight land use controls severely constrain 
the supply of space made available for new construction and thereby raise property prices 
enormously. The implied ‘regulatory tax’ appears to far exceed the negative externalities 
generated by new construction. This raises a natural question that this paper seeks to answer: Do 
these regulations solve the allocative problem or are they driven by redistribution motives? We 
find that redistribution motives are an important determinant of cross-metro area regulations in 
the US. Our results suggest that these motives do not only steer the voting behavior of local 
residents but also lobbying by non-residents – absentee landlords and owners of undeveloped 
land – who have a stake in the local land markets. We conclude that the current pattern of land 
use regulations is suboptimal. 
The paper also sheds light on the evolution and spatial patterns of land use regulations. Land use 
regulations are a recent phenomenon from a historical perspective. In the early 20th century, when 
only about a quarter of humans lived in urbanized areas, virtually no city had any zoning laws. 
                                                 
1 The stylized facts are borrowed from Fujita and Thisse (2002), Burchfield et al. (2006) and Glaeser (2008).  
2 See e.g. Rossi-Hansberg (2004) for a recent theoretical development on this issue. 
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San Francisco in 1880 and New York City in 1916 were early exceptions. Now that over half of 
the world population lives in cities, land use regulations are ubiquitous in all developed (and most 
developing) countries. Another striking phenomenon is that the tightness of land use regulations 
differs vastly across space. Land use regulations are often quite restrictive in highly attractive 
metro areas of a country (e.g. New York or San Francisco in the US, or the Greater London Area 
in the UK) but quite relaxed in many other places of the country (e.g. Houston or Pittsburgh in 
the US or Newcastle in the UK).  
Our theory assembles ingredients from the urban economics, political economics and industrial 
organization literatures so as to propose, first, a causal link from the increasing urbanization rates 
(a demographic pattern) to the spread of residential land use regulations (a political pattern) and, 
second, an original explanation for why highly desirable metro areas are more tightly regulated 
than the rest of the country. 
Our influential landowner hypothesis starts from the observation that one of the most salient 
economic effects of land use regulations is to increase the cost of future developments by 
restricting the amount of land zoned for development or increasing construction costs: either 
shifts the supply of new housing up and to the left, raising prices. This is good news for owners 
of the existing stock of developed land but the extra conversion cost is bad news for owners of 
hitherto undeveloped land (usually land developers). As the most obvious winners and losers, 
these two groups have strong incentives to influence the regulatory environment. As places grow 
over time, the share of developed land rises and with it the economic power of the owners of 
developed land relative to the owners of undeveloped land. Assuming that relative economic 
power is monotonically transformed into relative political power, the outcome is that places 
become increasingly regulated as they develop. 
The cross-sectional equivalent of our main theoretical prediction is that places with a higher share 
of developed land should be more regulated than places with a lot of undeveloped land. This 
proposition should hold both within and across metro areas. In our model the degree of regulation 
pertaining to a metro area can be characterized as the average of the local outcomes. Figure 1 
(panel a) plots the share of developed residential land (or SDL) in 1992 against the Wharton 
Residential Land Use Regulation Index (or WRLURI) in 2005 for our reference sample of the 93 
largest US Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs): the correlation  = .31 is statistically larger 
than zero. Figure 1 (panel b) suggests that this pattern was already visible in the data in the late 
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1970s ( = .34).3 Figure 1 (panel c) uses the aggregate property value per square meter of 
developable land in the MSA as an alternative to SDL; its correlation with WRLURI,  = .25, is 
also meaningful. 
In the rigorous econometric work that constitutes the bulk of our paper we take the equilibrium 
predictions of the model to our MSA-sample and test the influential landowner hypothesis, 
controlling for various other explanations. These include the welfare economics view (regulation 
internalizes externalities or provides public goods), the majority voting view (the ‘homevoter 
hypothesis’ – more on this in section 2 below), political ideology and sorting by income. We also 
run a battery of robustness checks to ensure that our proxy does indeed capture our influential 
landowner hypothesis and not another explanation.   
The empirical evidence in favor of our mechanism is threefold. First, the point of at least some 
regulation is to zone areas away from development; thus, if the cross sectional variation of the 
degree of restrictiveness of residential land use regulations was totally random, then we would 
expect to find a negative correlation between the regulatory variable (our dependent variable) and 
the SDL (our independent variable).4 The very fact that, controlling for all other explanations, we 
find a positive and statistically significant relationship between the two variables in our OLS 
estimates provides strong evidence in favor of our paradigm. Put differently, if the welfare 
economics view and the homevoter hypothesis were the only mechanisms at play, the coefficient 
of SDL should be statistically (weakly) negative. Yet, it is anything but. A Two-Stage-Least-
Square (TSLS) instrumental-variable strategy directly inspired by our theory provides the second 
piece of evidence. It addresses the reverse-causation (i.e., the downward bias of our SDL measure 
inherent in our OLS estimates) and omitted-variable issues. We confront our theory to the data in 
both stages of the econometric work to identify causal effects. The causal effect of SDL on 
regulatory restrictiveness finds strong and extremely robust support in our MSA-sample. Third, 
out-of-sample evidence from other studies suggests that our paradigm also finds support within 
metro areas (Fischel 2004, Gyourko et al. 2008, Rudel 1989).  
Finally, our quantitative exercises reveal that the causal mechanism we uncover is economically 
very meaningful. The implications of this set of results can hardly be overstated: the current 
                                                 
3 We use the 1992 satellite data as in Burchfield et al. (2006) to construct our SDL measure. The WRLURI measure 
is due to Gyourko et al. (2008) and pertains to year 2005.We construct the share of developed residential land using 
1976 data collected by aerial photographs and use the regulatory index constructed by Saks (2008) for 81 of the 
largest US MSAs.  
4 This logic finds strong support in the data, as we document in Section 6. 
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pattern of land use regulations in the US is neither efficient nor ‘democratic’, in that it goes 
beyond maximizing social well-being and does not conform to the wishes of a majority of 
households.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related work. Section 3 presents 
the model, with special emphasis on the theoretical predictions that we take to the data. Section 4 
describes the data and our identification strategy and provides baseline results.  Section 5 reports 
robustness checks. Section 6 revisits the effect of land use regulations on MSA growth and 
Section 7 concludes. 
2. Related literature 
The restrictiveness of land use regulations varies strongly across the United States (Glaeser et al. 
2005a, b) and Europe (Cheshire and Hilber 2008). The first empirical contribution of this paper is 
to identify the origins of this cross-sectional variation. Evenson and Wheaton (2003) and Glaeser 
and Ward (2009) regress measures of various types of land use regulations on historical and other 
characteristics of Massachusetts towns. For instance, historical population density (1915 in the 
case of Glaeser and Ward) has a positive effect on current minimum lot size restrictions. They 
conclude from their exercise that ‘the bulk of these rules seem moderately random and unrelated 
to the most obvious explanatory variables’ (Glaeser and Ward 2009: 266). Our analysis shows 
that looking at aggregated measures of regulation across the major US MSAs reveals systematic 
patterns. The most closely related study to ours is Saiz (2010) and the papers complement each 
other in important ways. For each MSA in his sample, Saiz builds a measure of developable land 
and regresses WRLURI on this measure. His findings suggest that cities with a relatively small 
fraction of developable land are more regulated. By contrast, we create a measure of developed 
land (SDL) that has developable land at the denominator.5  Therefore, we take the physical 
constraints to expanding human settlements in existing MSAs as given and, guided by our theory, 
we aim to understand how the fraction of land actually developed influences regulation, 
emphasizing political economy mechanisms. Our model also suggests that the most desirable 
places should indirectly be the most regulated. This accords well with Glaeser et al. (2005a), who 
find that the regulatory tax is highest in Manhattan and in the Bay area (exceeding 50% of house 
values), while they find no evidence for a regulatory tax in places such as Pittsburgh or Detroit. 
In addition, our paper enables us to shed a new perspective on some of the results unveiled by 
                                                 
5 Saiz (2008) excludes water bodies, wetlands and slopes of 15% or more to construct his measure of developable 
land. We use a comparable dataset, except that we base our definition of non-developable land on land cover data. 
See also Burchfield et al. (2006) and Hilber and Mayer (2009). 
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Burchfield et al. (2006). For instance, they find that cities with better natural amenities sprawl 
more than others – likely because of minimum lot size restrictions that reduce the capital-to-land 
ratio. In the model, we attribute this phenomenon to endogenous land use constraints; in our 
empirical work, we find that locations with more desirable amenities are more developed and 
more regulated. 
In the US, land use regulations are largely determined by local planning boards whose members 
are elected by local residents. Accordingly, the dominant political economics view suggests that 
local land use regulations correspond to the wishes of a majority of voters (Fischel 2001, Ortalo-
Magné and Prat 2007). Fischel’s ‘homevoter hypothesis’ postulates that homeowners – in 
contrast to renters – favor regulations because it raises their property value and, in turn, suggests 
that jurisdictions with a larger share of homeowners should be more regulated. Available 
evidence is strongly suggestive that ‘homevoters’ (and conservationists) are influential in 
regulating land use locally (e.g. Dehring et al. 2008). However, these influences may have less 
explanatory power in explaining across metro area differences in planning restrictiveness. As 
Figure 1 (panel d) illustrates, the homeownership rate and land use regulations are significantly 
negatively correlated in our sample of MSAs (the homeownership rate is roughly twice as high in 
the loosly regulated Pittsburgh and Houston compared to the tightly regulated New York).  
Like Fischel (2001) and Ortalo-Magné and Prat (2007), we understand land use regulations as the 
outcome of political economic forces at work. By contrast, we assume that landowners (who 
include the group of homeowners) lobby and influence planning boards and that these implement 
policies that maximize land value as a result. Such policies, by catering to ‘land based interests’ 
(Molotch 1976), may then hurt consumers and overall welfare, as stressed by Brueckner (1995) 
and Helsley and Strange (1995).6  
A dynamic interpretation of our model is also consistent with the findings of Fischel (2004), 
Rudel (1989) and Gyourko et al. (2008). According to Fischel (2004), land use regulations 
originate within larger cities and then zoning spreads quickly to the suburbs and surrounding 
towns as the city grows. The most direct evidence that the timing and restrictiveness of zoning is 
tied to the distance from the central city comes from Rudel (1989) who shows that the 
Connecticut municipalities located at a greater distance to New York City adopted land-use laws 
                                                 
6 Epple et al. (1988) also develop a model in which owners of developed land (‘early arrivals’ in their terminology) 
impose policies that hurt later entrants when they control the political agenda. 
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later than those closer to the Big Apple. Gyourko et al. (2008) find that municipalities within 
MSAs tend to be more highly regulated than their counterparts outside of MSAs.  
In our empirical analysis we find that regulations slow down new development, confirming the 
findings of Quigley and Raphael (2005) for California or Glaeser and Ward (2009) for Boston. 
There is thus a two-way relationship between regulation and urban development. Our estimates 
imply that a one standard deviation difference in MSA-level SDL in 1976 results in a roughly 2 
percentage point-decrease in the growth of housing supply between 1990 and 2000 via 
differentially affecting regulatory restrictiveness during the late 1970s and 1980s. This accounts 
for about 15 percent of the growth in new construction during that period. 
We also contribute to the theoretical literature in two ways. First, our combination of a discrete 
choice model and of a standard monocentric city (MCC) model for ‘macro’ (across-city) and 
‘micro’ (within city) location decisions, respectively, is unique in the urban economics literature. 
This combination provides a useful generalization of the currently available extreme versions of 
the MCC model, whereby each MSA is either fully isolated (‘closed’) – the population supply to 
each city is inelastic and utility varies across MSAs – or small and fully ‘open’, that is, the utility 
level is exogenous and population supply is infinitely elastic (Brueckner 1987). In our model, 
both MSA sizes and average utility levels vary across MSAs and are determined endogenously. 
Second, jurisdictions set their policies non-cooperatively and a jurisdiction’s policy spills over to 
other communities because consumers are mobile, as in Brueckner (1995) and Helsley and 
Strange (1995). In our model, the Nash equilibrium in land use regulations exists and is unique 
under fairly mild conditions; Helsley and Strange (1995) use a model in which at least one 
jurisdiction is inactive and acknowledge that ‘it is not possible to consider population controls 
when all communities are active without substantially modifying [their] model’ (p. 456). We 
propose one such modification. 
3. The model 
The set of players and the timing of the game are as follows. In stage 1, the planning boards of a 
set of local jurisdictions (which differ in exogenously given characteristics) simultaneously 
choose a zoning policy, taking the other planning boards’ choices as given. Each jurisdiction 
belongs to exactly one MSA and the set of MSAs is a partition of the set of jurisdictions. In stage 
2, households make location decisions of two kinds. They first choose a jurisdiction where to 
live; a bidding process for land then allocates households within each jurisdiction. Finally, 
payoffs are realized. The equilibrium concept is a (subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium in zoning 
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policies: all agents are rational and forward-looking.7 We now formally describe the set of 
players, their strategy sets and their payoff functions. 
3.1. Households’ location choice 
In stage 1, a continuum of H households indexed by [0, ]h H allocate themselves to a number J 
> 1 of jurisdictions indexed by {1,..., }j J . Households established in jurisdiction j derive 
utility uj. Following the Random Utility Theory, which finds its origins in psychology (Thurstone 
1927), we assume that uj is a random variable and we model the fraction fj of households that 
choose to live in jurisdiction j as  
 Pr maxj j k kf u u  .           (1) 
Specifically, the household-specific realization of uj, denoted as uj(h), has a common component 
Vj and an idiosyncratic, random households-specific component j(h) with cumulative density G. 
These components add up as  
( ) ( ) , ( ) ~ i.i.d. ( )j j j ju h V h h G    .        (2) 
The common component Vj is deterministic and summarizes the costs and benefits from living in 
jurisdiction j, expressed in monetary units; think about it as the indirect utility or real income. 
The idiosyncratic component ( )j h  is random (Manski 1977, Anderson et al. 1992) and 
summarizes the idiosyncratic utility that h derives from consuming local amenities. Households 
are heterogeneous in their appreciation of these amenities. 8  In order to get simple, explicit 
solutions, we assume that the ’s are uniformly distributed over the interval [ / 2, / 2]  , where 
 is proportional to the standard deviation of G. The mean and mode of G are zero, meaning that 
the average and median households are a-priory indifferent about where to live.9 As a result of 
this and (2), the location choice probabilities in (1) are equivalent to  
                                                 
7 As in all papers in which interest groups lobby the executive power in order to raise their rent, we assume entry of 
developers away as entry erodes rents. Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007) show how both ingredients can be 
simultaneously included in a dynamic stochastic model. This issue is beyond the scope of this paper so we omit it for 
simplicity. 
8 Consider the following examples to fix ideas. Within the metro area of Los Angeles, people-watchers prefer to live 
in Venice Beach and recreation and golf lovers in Bel Air, ceteris paribus. Similarly, at the more aggregate level, 
skiers prefer local jurisdictions in the Boulder MSA, whereas windsurfers prefer locations in the San Francisco MSA 
In the empirical section below, we use an MSA’s access to a major coast and its mild winter temperatures as the 
natural amenities people care about (Rosen 1979, Roback 1982, Glaeser et al. 2001, Rappaport 2007). 
9 Specifically, Var() = 2/12 and G() = (2 + )/(2). The deterministic case obtains at the limit  = 0. The reader 
may be more familiar to modeling discrete location decisions with the multinomial logit model. We show in 
Appendix C (not intended for publication) that the equilibrium properties of the multinomial logit are qualitatively 
similar to the linear case. We choose to work with the linear model because we obtain simple, closed form solutions. 
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1 1 jj
V V
f
J 
     
             (3) 
with fj = 0 or fj = 1 in an obvious manner if the RHS above falls outside the unit interval and 
/kkV V J  (throughout the paper, we use ‘upper bars’ to denote averages across 
jurisdictions). An implication of (3) is that jurisdictions that command a higher-than-average 
indirect utility Vj attract more households than the average jurisdiction. The degree of household 
heterogeneity  governs the sensitivity of fj with respect to the utility differential: heterogeneous 
populations are less sensitive to differences in the common components 1,..., JV V .  
We assume that the common component Vj is a function of economic and non-economic 
variables pertaining to jurisdiction j: let 
j j j jV a w c t    ,            (4) 
where aj is a measure of the observable quality of local amenities (converted in monetary units), 
w denotes the household’s income,  cj captures the monetary costs of living associated with j and 
tj is a local ‘regulatory tax’ levied on residents (more on this below). Household h’s global 
appreciation of jurisdiction j’s amenities is thus equal to aj + j(h). aj summarizes the attributes of 
local amenities that can be ranked across the average population (hence the term ‘quality’).10  
In this paper, the land market outcomes play the central role, so we treat aj and w as parameters 
but we endogenize the cost of living as follows. Assume that jurisdiction j is a linear monocentric 
city (Alonso 1964), in which the per-unit distance commuting cost is equal to   and the unit cost 
of converting land into housing is constant and equal to mj. Then, if Hj households live in j, cj is 
equal to Hj + mj .11  Substituting this expression for cj in (4) yields:  
                                                                                                                                                              
There is a tradition in the Political Economics literature that uses linear discrete choice models to model voters’ 
decisions to cast their ballot for a candidate or another (Persson and Tabellini, 2000). 
10 As an illustration, let us compare a representative jurisdiction in the Boulder MSA to a representative jurisdiction 
in the San Francisco MSA (j = B, SF). Ranking access to mountain slopes versus access to the ocean is clearly a 
mater of individual taste but most people prefer mild to very cold winter temperatures: the latter implies aSF > aB. Put 
differently, the distribution of aSF + SF stochastically dominates the distribution of aB + B and, keeping the 
economic attributes of VB and VSF in (4) equal, a larger fraction of households would then choose to live in a 
municipality in the San Francisco MSA rather than in one in the Boulder MSA. 
11 To see this, assume that all city dwellers consume one unit of land and that the central business district (CBD) is 
located at d = 0, so that a city of size Hj stretches out from 0 to Hj. Assume further that that the unit cost of 
converting farm land for housing consumption is equal to mj. Without loss of generality, we assume that the 
opportunity cost of land at the urban fringe is zero. Each city dweller commutes to the CBD at a constant per unit 
distance cost  > 0. The city residential land market is at an equilibrium when the sum of commuting costs and land 
rent are identical across city locations (a no arbitrage condition), thus the equilibrium bid rent schedule (net of 
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;j j j j j j jV H t a w m        ,         (5) 
where j summarizes the ‘fundamental’ (parametric) determinants of welfare in jurisdiction j. We 
say that a jurisdiction characterized by a high j is a ‘desirable’ location ex ante (or that it is 
fundamentally desirable). The congestion cost Hj and regulatory cost tj are endogenous to the 
model. The former rises with jurisdiction size; the latter is the outcome of the political economy 
game of section 3.2 below. Plugging (5) into (3) establishes that the fraction fj of households 
wishing to live in jurisdiction j is decreasing in the regulatory tax it levies, decreasing in its level 
of congestion and increasing in the desirability of jurisdiction j, which includes amenities and 
wages.  
Define the vectors 1[ ,..., ]'Jt tt  and 1[ ,..., ]'JH HH . Households treat t and H as parameters. 
We define as a spatial equilibrium for H a situation in which, given the induced equilibrium 
values of (3) and (5), no household wishes to relocate to another jurisdiction. Formally, the actual 
fraction of households living in j, Hj/H, must be equal to fj.  Defining /H H J  and using (5) 
and (3), we may define the spatial equilibrium as  
   
: 1 j j jj jj
t H t HH H
j f
H H
   

          .    (6) 
That is, the fraction of people living in j is increasing in the local well-being net of the regulatory 
tax and congestion costs and decreasing in the well-being net of regulatory tax and congestion 
costs of other jurisdictions. Since households directly consume one unit of land for housing 
purposes in the linear MCC model, the equilibrium Hj is also the equilibrium fraction of 
developed land in jurisdiction j. We readily obtain the following: 
 
Proposition 1 (existence and uniqueness of the spatial equilibrium). Assume that the fraction 
of households that wish to live in jurisdiction j is given by (3) and that the observable real income 
is given by (5). Then the spatial equilibrium defined in (6) exists and is unique. 
Proof . See Appendix A. 
Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium concept. The downward-sloping schedule illustrates the fact 
that as jurisdictions get more populated they get more congested and thus less desirable, ceteris 
                                                                                                                                                              
conversion costs mj) is r(d) =  (Hj – d). As a result, the cost of living is cj = Hj + mj, the aggregate land rent is equal 
to H2/2 and j = aj + w - mj, as in (5).  
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paribus. A higher j and/or a lower tj shift this schedule upwards. Thus, at equilibrium more 
desirable locations have more households. To see this formally, solve (6) explicitly for jH : 
   
1 j jj
t tH
H H
 
 
     .           (7) 
Together with (5), (7) implies 
    0 0 01 ,j j j HV t t H H               .      (8) 
At the spatial equilibrium, households obtain a real income that is a weighted average of the local 
fundamental desirability net of regulatory taxes (the first term in the RHS above) and of the 
average of the same object (the second term), minus the average congestion cost. The weight of j-
specific characteristics (relative to the average) increases in , our measure of the intensity of 
idiosyncratic household preferences for local specificities. Several aspects of (7) and (8) are 
noteworthy. First, jurisdictions that receive more households than the average H  either are 
fundamentally desirable, or have a low regulatory tax, or both, relative to the average jurisdiction. 
Second, the effect of either variable on the spatial outcome is decreasing in the heterogeneity of 
households  and in the overall crowding of jurisdictions H . Third, all jurisdictions yield about 
the same welfare ex post: congestion and labor mobility between jurisdictions together ensure 
that in each jurisdiction the marginal household is indifferent between staying put and living in its 
next best alternative. All infra-marginal households are strictly better off in the jurisdiction of 
their choosing. To get a sense of this, consider the difference of the real incomes at the spatial 
equilibrium for two arbitrary jurisdictions j and k; using (8), we obtain 
0(1 ) ( ) ( )j k j k j kV V t t          . At the limit 0   (homogeneous population), all 
populated jurisdictions yield exactly the same welfare. Otherwise, for  > 0 households do not 
enjoy exactly the same real wage everywhere at the spatial equilibrium because they are willing 
to forego some economic benefits to live in jurisdictions that offer the non-economic amenities 
that they enjoy the most.  
3.2. Planning boards choose regulation 
We assume that each jurisdiction j has a planning board that regulates the use of land. Land use 
restrictions can take many forms. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the main effect of 
such regulations is to increase the individual cost of living in the jurisdiction of each household 
by tj. We interpret tj as a ‘regulatory tax’ (Glaeser et al. 2005a, b) and assume that it is capitalized 
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into the price of developed land (Oates 1969, Palmon and Smith 1998). This capitalization effect 
captures in a parsimonious way the fact that land use regulations reallocate the local demand for 
land away from potential new developments to existing ones (keeping total demand for land Hj 
constant). In addition to this direct effect that benefits owners of developed land at the expense of 
owners of undeveloped land, a higher regulatory tax in j decreases the desirability of j as per (5), 
which in turn reduces the equilibrium population size and equilibrium amount of developed land 
in jurisdiction j as per (6); the former effect reduces the average land rent in the jurisdiction.12 
Thus, the overall indirect effect tends to hurt all landowners.  
Here, we depart from the standard literature by assuming that the planning board caters to the 
landowners’ interests. In the wake of Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and Dixit et al. (1997), we 
assume that the owners of developed land and the owners of undeveloped land (or land 
developers) form two competing lobbies that influence the planning board by way of lobbying 
contributions. Specifically, we assume that the planning board maximizes aggregate lobbying 
contributions j jC c

 , with {owners of developed land, land developers}. This objective 
function conveys the idea that the planning board caters only to the interests of land stakeholders. 
We return to this bold assumption below. Note that land stakeholders include absentee landlords, 
local landlords, land developers, homeowners and even renters when rent controls are in place 
(de facto, rent controls act as way to share land rents between the owner and the renter).  
We also assume that each group offers a ‘menu’ of contributions to the planning board, 
contingent on the degree of regulation tj actually chosen so that ( )j j jc c t
  . Many contribution 
schemes are possible (and thus many Nash equilibria exist), but Bernheim and Whinston (1986) 
show that the set of best responses of each lobby to any contribution scheme chosen by the other 
players includes a linear schedule of the form ( ) ( )j j j j jc t R t c
    , where jR  is the aggregate 
land rent pertaining to lobby  and jc  is a constant determined at equilibrium. 13 Thus, the 
                                                 
12 This point is easily made:   20 ( )d / 2jHj jTR r d t H , so the average land rent (defined as ARj ≡ TRj / Hj) is 
linearly increasing in Hj. It is not difficult to show that ARj is increasing in Hj also in nonlinear MCC models 
(Brueckner 1987). 
13 The timing of the contribution game is as follows. The lobbies (the ‘principals’) move first and simultaneously, the 
planning board (the ‘agent’) then chooses to accept the contributions or not and, contingent on accepting some, both, 
or no contributions, chooses tj. Since the principals move first, at equilibrium they choose jc
  so as to ensure that the 
agent accepts the contribution and enforces a regulation that is closer to the interests of lobby . These linear 
contribution schedules also have the desirable property to produce the unique ‘coalition proof Nash equilibrium’ of 
the game. Goldberg and Maggi (1999) show how a model in which tj is set by cooperative Nash bargaining produces 
a similar policy outcome. 
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owners of developed land are offering a contribution schedule that is increasing in the degree of 
regulation; land developers’ contributions are decreasing in tj. The literal interpretation of this 
working hypothesis is that stakeholders bribe the planning boards in order to sway its decisions. 
We may also understand the word ‘influence’ in a broader and more benign sense, such as 
pressure groups acting as experts and conveying useful information to the executives. By using 
legal contributions so as to buy access to executives (Austen-Smith 1995, Lohmann 1995), 
pressure groups provide credible information to legislators.14 As a result of these assumptions, the 
planning board maximizes total land rents plus the regulatory tax revenue: 
0
2
( ) ( ) d ( )
( ) ( ) ,
2
jH
j j j j
j j j
R H x x t H
H t H


    
   
t t t
t t
        (9) 
where Hj(t) is given by (7). Two aspects of the program  max
jt j
R t  are noteworthy. First, the 
planning board gives equal weight to the cost and benefit to landowners of raising the local 
regulatory tax tj.  Second, maximizing only the first component of Rj(t) above and ignoring 
strategic interactions among jurisdictions would lead planning boards to choose the first best 
policy by the Henry George theorem; this would be tj = 0 for all j since there is no market failure 
in the model. 
3.3. Subgame perfect equilibrium 
We solve for a Nash (subgame perfect) equilibrium (SPE henceforth) in regulatory taxes. Thus, 
j’s planning board chooses jt   so as to maximize (9) subject to (7) taking the vector 
 
0
\{ }k k jt 0-jt  as given (the superscript ‘0’ pertains to equilibrium values). Then the first order 
condition for this program may be written as 
 
0 0
0 0 0 0( , ) ( , ) 0 , 0
j j j j
j j j j j j j j
j jt t t t
R t H H t H t t
t t

 
      
0 0
-j -jt t ,  (10) 
with complementary slackness; 0jH  is the equilibrium jurisdiction size, namely (7) evaluated at 
the Nash tax vector 0 01[ ,..., ]'Jt t0t  (also 0 01[ ,..., ]'JH H0H ).  The RHS consists of respectively 
the direct effect (keeping the population constant) and the indirect effect (allowing it to vary in 
                                                 
14 The non-partisan research group Centre for Responsive Politics (CPR) reports that the National Association of 
Realtors topped the CPR’s top-20 list of Political Action Committees contributing to federal candidates both in 
2005/6 and 2007/8. The National Association of Home Builders ranked 4th and 12th, respectively. 
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response) of an increase in the specific regulatory tax. At an interior equilibrium, the cost and 
benefits of raising tj are equal. Let 
0
1 1J J H
J J H
   
              (11) 
be a measure of the toughness of fiscal competition among jurisdictions:  is increasing in the 
number of jurisdictions J and decreasing in the heterogeneity of households . Then, using (7) 
and (11) and assuming that the parameters of the model are such that the resulting 0jH ’s in (10) 
are all interior (precise conditions to follow in (16)), we may develop the first order condition 
(10) to get a non-negative equilibrium relationship between population size 0jH  and the 
regulation tax 0jt :  
0 01
j jt H
 
 .            (12) 
Together, (7) and (12) compose a system of 2J equations in H0 and t0. Solving for individual 
regulatory taxes and populations yields:  
0 1 1 ( )
12
j jt H
J
    
   
 
,         (13)  
where the coefficient of ( )j   is strictly positive and smaller than unity, and 
0 1 ( )12
j jH H
J
   
  
 
,         (14) 
1,...,j J . All the properties of the spatial equilibrium continue to hold at the SPE that (13) and 
(14) characterize. Four additional properties resulting from strategic interactions are noteworthy. 
First, the equilibrium regulatory tax increases in own desirability and decreases in the desirability 
of other jurisdictions; this effect is stronger, the higher the heterogeneity of households  and the 
lower the congestion costs H  are. The former cross-effect arises because a homogenous 
population is more responsive to any differences in amenities and taxes across locations; the 
latter arises because, when congestion costs are large, cross-jurisdiction differences along other 
dimensions matter relatively less for households’ location choices. Second, places that are more 
desirable are more developed at equilibrium, despite being more regulated. That is, endogenous 
regulation does not change the ranking of jurisdictions according to their j; this follows by 
inspection of (13) and from  < 1. Third, equilibrium tax rates are decreasing in the number of 
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jurisdictions and increasing in the heterogeneity of workers, ceteris paribus. This can be 
interpreted as a pro-competitive effect: as  rises, each jurisdiction perceives a lower land-
demand elasticity from households. Finally, the average regulatory tax is increasing in the size of 
the population, keeping the number of jurisdictions constant: as existing jurisdictions become 
increasingly crowded and developed, the political balance tilts in favor of the owners of 
developed land. 
The second derivative of Rj with respect to tj is invariant and negative for any t: 
2
2
(2 )0 ( )j
j
R
t
 

     .         (15) 
So we may write: 
Proposition 2 (existence and uniqueness of the SPE tax setting game). The Subgame perfect 
equilibrium characterized by (13) and (14) exists and is unique.  
Proof. See Appendix A. 
We can also formally establish the subgame perfect equilibrium properties of our model: 
Proposition 3 (properties of the subgame perfect equilibrium). Assume:  
 2 1 / 2 1 /: ( 1)j
J Jj H J H      
           .   (16) 
Then the SPE characteristics of the model, summarized in (13) and (14), imply: 
(i)  Places that are fundamentally more desirable are more developed: 
0 0
j k j kH H    ; 
(ii) Places that are more developed are more regulated: 0 0 0 0j k j kH H t t   . 
Proof . See Appendix A. 
These are the properties that we test in section 4: (i) is the first stage of our TSLS instrumental 
variable (IV) approach, whereas (ii) is the second stage. The equilibrium properties of the model 
that we do not directly test include: 
Corollary 3.1 (further properties of the SPE). Assume that (16) holds. Then: 
(iii) Regulatory taxes are strictly positive for all j; 
(iv) The fundamental amenities of a jurisdiction are not fully capitalized into the 
regulatory tax: 0 0j k j j k kt t        ; 
(v) Despite being more developed and more regulated, fundamentally more desirable 
places command a larger indirect utility: 0 0j k j kV V    . 
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Proof. See Appendix A. 
Our model can also shed light on the demographic origins of land use regulations: 
Corollary 3.2 (urbanization and land use regulations). The overall extent of regulation 
increases with the size of the urban population in the economy; furthermore, all jurisdictions are 
affected: 
(vi) The average regulatory tax is increasing in H  and in H : 0 / 0t H    and 
0 / 0t H   ; 
(vii) The variance of the regulatory tax is decreasing in the size of the urban population: 
0Var( ) / 0t H   .  
Proof. See Appendix A. 
The parameter restriction (16) requires the variation in the desirable fundamentals to be bounded 
above relative to household heterogeneity and congestion costs – not a very stringent condition – 
and in doing so ensures that the equilibrium population in any j is positive for the interior solution 
t0. We make this assumption for analytical convenience only. Relaxing it would require us to 
replace the strict inequalities in Proposition 3 by weak inequalities. 
 
3.4. Lobbying, voting and benevolent planning 
So far we have been assuming that planning boards only cater to ‘land-based interests’. A 
utilitarian urban planner would choose tj so as to maximise total welfare ( ) ( ) ( )j j j j j jH t V t R t ; 
one that seeks to please voters may maximise the welfare of the current residents 
( ) ( )j j j j jH V t R t , where  is the share of land rents earned by local residents. A parsimonious 
way to model the behaviour of a planning board that responds simultaneously to social welfare, 
electoral considerations and lobbying pressure is to assume that it maximises the weighted sum 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )j j j j j j jt b H t V t R t      ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )j j j j j jv H V t R t b v C t       , where parameters b 
and v respectively capture the ‘benevolence’ of the planning board and its responsiveness to the 
average voter’s well-being. Imposing b = v = 0 as in e.g. Krishna (1998) gives us  ( )j jt ( )j jC t  
and yields clear cut results. 
Removing this assumption has no bearing on Proposition 2 (existence and uniqueness of the SPE) 
but it has the following implications. First, insofar as the regulatory tax benefits landowners (at 
least when they are low to start with) at the expense of other residents and voters, the equilibrium 
regulatory taxes tend to be lower than in (10) if b, v > 0. To see this, rewrite ( )j jt  as 
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   ( ) 1 (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )j j j j j j j j j j jt v R t vH V t bH t V t       and note that the term in the curly 
bracket, which is new with respect to (9), is decreasing in tj by (5) and (7). Then 0 / 0jt b    and 
0 / 0jt v    follow by the second order condition (15) and the envelope theorem. Second, if b and 
v are small enough (i.e. if (2 ) 1b v     holds) then the qualitative results summarized in 
Proposition 3 carry through unaltered. Otherwise, if the planning board cares about social welfare 
or the voters’ well being enough, then it can be shown that jurisdictions that are more developed 
are less regulated at equilibrium. The implications of our theory and those of two important 
alternative hypotheses are thus mutually exclusive.  
3.5. Cross-Metro Area theoretical predictions 
As we shall see in the immediate sequel, our data is a cross-section of MSAs. Yet, in the US 
regulatory decisions are taken at the local level. Also, the theory so far has cross-sectional 
implications for jurisdictions. Fortunately, a simple, single step is required to match the two. 
Assume that there is a number M < J of MSAs in the economy indexed by   1,...,m M ; the set 
of MSAs is a partition of  . In other words, each MSA is comprised of at least one jurisdiction 
and each jurisdiction belongs to exactly one MSA; we use m  to denote the subset of 
jurisdictions that belong to MSA m. Consider an arbitrary MSA m; then we can define any 
average variable pertaining to MSA m as    1 mm m jjx x ,   , ,j j j jx H t . 
The relationships we want to test below – between amenities and land development, on the one 
hand, and land development and local regulation, on the other – are both monotonic; so they also 
hold across MSAs. To see this, use the definition for MSA averages above into (12) so as to 
rewrite the development-regulation relationship as 
 
0 01m mt H  
and into (14) so as to rewrite the amenity-development relationship as  
   
  
 
0 1 ( )12
m mH H
J
. 
The former expression implies   0 0/ 0m mt H ; the latter implies   0 0/ 0m mH . Thus, we have 
shown that Proposition 3(i) and Proposition 3(ii) also hold across MSAs. 
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4. Empirical Analysis 
The main purpose of our empirical analysis is to explore the causal effect of physical residential 
development on regulatory restrictiveness at the MSA-level. It follows from the spatial 
equilibrium of our theory (7) and from the very purpose of regulation that residential 
development is endogenous to the regulatory environment. Therefore, we need an exogenous 
source of variation of urban development in order to identify its effect on regulation. Our theory 
readily suggests two sets of instruments: natural amenities and topography: desirable locations 
(those with a high am) and locations that contain a lot of plains (and hence have a low average 
conversion cost mm) are more developed at equilibrium by (7). In our main empirical analysis we 
use land use data from 1992 to explore the causal effect of the share developed residential land on 
regulatory restrictiveness around 2005.  
4.1. Description of data 
Our data is derived from various sources and geographical levels of aggregation. We match all 
data to the MSA level using GIS. Table 1 provides summary statistics for all variables. The top 
panel pertains to our main sample period (turn of 21st century); the bottom panel reports the 
variables that belong to the earlier sample (around 1980). 
The more recent of our two land use datasets, the National Land Cover Data 1992 (NLCD 92), is 
derived from satellite images. The earlier dataset, the Land Use and Land Cover GIRAS Spatial 
Data, comes from aerial photos taken around 1976. Both datasets cover the surface areas of all 
MSAs in our sample.15 There is a considerable difference in map resolution and in land use 
definitions between 1976 and 1992, making direct comparisons of the data difficult. The two 
datasets are described in more detail in Burchfield et al. (2006). 
We define the share developed land in an MSA (henceforth SDL) as 
    
   
developed residential land areaSDL
developable residential land area
 ,       (17) 
where the ‘developable residential land area’ is the total land area minus the surface area that is 
covered by industrial land or ‘non-developable’ land uses (i.e., soil that does not sufficiently 
                                                 
15 A special case is the MSA of Washington, DC. While we have data for the surface area of the MSA outside the 
District of Columbia, we do not have any information for the District itself. Hence we imputed SDL by assuming 
that land uses within the District are similar to that at the boundaries. Since the District covers only about 1 percent 
of the MSA’s surface area, this adjustment increases the SDL measure for the MSA by only about half a percentage 
point. None of our results changes notably if we assume that the District is either not at all or fully developed nor if 
we drop the observation altogether.  
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support permanent structures and/or is extremely costly to develop).16 SDL is our proxy for Hj in 
the model and captures the political influence of owners of developed land relative to the 
influence of owners of undeveloped land. 
The homeownership rates (HOR henceforth) for 1980 and 1990 are extracted from the 
Neighborhood Community Database (NCDB). We compute population densities in the developed 
residential area (POPD) using NCDB and NLCD data. (POPD and HOR respectively control for 
the alternative welfare economics and homevoter hypotheses.) 
We use the two regulatory indices as the counterpart in the data to the regulatory tax tm in the 
model. Each of these indices is derived from a different source and pertains to a different time 
period. WRLURI is a measure of differences in the local land use regulatory climate across more 
than 2600 communities across the US based on a 2005 survey and a separate study of state 
executive, legislative, and court activities. It is arguably the most comprehensive survey to date. 
See Gyourko et al. (2008) for details on the compilation. Saiz (2010) reports WRLURI values for 
95 MSAs (our sample consists of 93 MSAs; we loose two observations for lack of data on 1880 
population density). A WRLURI value of 1 implies that the measure is one standard deviation 
above the national mean. The SAKS measure was created by Saks (2008) as a ‘comprehensive 
index of housing supply regulation’ by using the simple average of six independent surveys 
conducted during the second half of the 1970s and the 1980s (see Saks 2008 for details). Saks 
reports regulatory index values for 83 MSAs. We loose two observations for lack of land use data 
and for lack of information on historic density.17 Similar to the WRLURI, the SAKS index is 
scaled to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. 
There is considerable variation in the degree of land use regulation across US MSAs. Gyourko et 
al. (2008) suggest that there is more variation across than within MSAs. Other empirically 
motivated reasons also lead us to choose to run our regressions at the MSA level. In many MSAs 
only few municipalities responded to the surveys that are the foundation of the WRLURI and 
SAKS measures and many potentially important controls are available at the MSA- or state-level 
only. See also Gyourko et al. (2008) and Saiz (2010) on the merits of using MSA aggregates in 
                                                 
16 These land uses include barren, water, ice, wetlands, and shrubland (1992 classifications) and ‘undefined’, barren, 
water, ice, wetlands, shrub/brush land, dry salt flats, beaches, sandy areas, bare exposed rock, strip mines, all 
categories of tundra except herbaceous tundra (1976 classifications). We experimented classifying all tundra as ‘non-
developable’ or ‘developable’. Results are virtually unchanged in all the specifications to follow.  
17 Glaeser et al. (2005a) estimate a regulatory tax for 21 MSAs using 1998 data. The interested reader may find this 
regulatory tax, WRLURI, SAKS and SDL values for these cities in Table U1 (not for publication). We also report 
pair-wise correlations and rank correlations of these variables as well as of the homeownership rates. 
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this context. Our decision to use aggregate indices – rather than various measures of different 
types of land use regulation – allows us to capture the overall regulatory environment, while 
avoiding the loss of statistical clarity associated with trying to look at the effects of various types 
of regulations simultaneously (Glaeser and Ward 2009). 
Our amenity measures and the region dummies are derived from the Environmental Systems 
Research Institute’s (ESRI) Census 2000 MSA-level shape file. The sources for our other 
(excluded) instruments and controls are listed in the note to Table 1.   
4.2. Baseline empirical specification and results using OLS 
Our objective in this section is to test the predictions of our model as directly as possible. The key 
prediction, stated in Proposition 3 (ii), follows from (10): places that are more developed are 
more regulated, i.e. 0 0/ 0m mt H   . The homevoter hypothesis argues that places with a higher 
homeownership rate should be more regulated. The welfare economics view suggests that 
regulation corrects for market failures in the urban economy (e.g. ‘externality zoning’). We use 
population density as a proxy for the intensity of these market failures. The motivation for this is 
that all urban economic theories predict that externalities that are conductive to agglomeration 
economies and urban costs are sensitive to distance: denser places generate more non-market 
interactions and pecuniary externalities, both conductive to urban growth (e.g. knowledge 
spillovers, labor market matching) and to urban costs (e.g. noise). These complementary 
explanations can be nested in the following model: 
        0 1 2 3 4m m m m m mWRLURI POPD controls          SDL HOR ,  (18) 
where WRLURI is our measure for the restrictiveness of regulation and m is the error term with 
the standard assumed properties. The priors are 1 > 0 by the ‘influential landowner’ hypothesis, 
2 > 0 by Fischel’s ‘homevoter’ hypothesis and 3 > 0 by the welfare economics hypothesis. The 
variables in bold are potentially endogenously determined. Putting this issue aside, we start by 
running (18) by OLS. The controls include share democratic votes, namely, the state share of 
votes that went for the Democratic candidate in the 1988 and the 1992 presidential elections 
(allowing for the fact that regulatory restrictiveness may be driven by political ideology), average 
household wage (to control for the possibility that the findings are driven by income sorting), and 
regional dummies (to capture all other region-specific unobservable characteristics). The 
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estimation results are reported in column (1) of Table 2.18 The adjusted R2 of 0.377 is reasonably 
high. Among the coefficients of interest, only 1 has the expected sign and is statistically 
significant. This preliminary finding is encouraging for our influential landowner hypothesis. 
Turning attention to the controls, we see that MSAs in Democrat-leaning states are more 
regulated. Our interpretation is that liberal voters (in North American parlance) are ideologically 
more sympathetic to regulation than conservative voters.19 This result is robust to adding an 
interaction term between share democratic votes and average income; the coefficient is 
insignificant, suggesting that blue collar and white collar Democrats do not hold significantly 
different views on regulations.20  Region dummies reveal that broad geographic patterns emerge, 
with the West being the most regulated region and the Midwest (the omitted category) the least 
regulated.  
4.3. Identification strategy and results for IV-specifications 
One important caveat with the OLS estimates of (18) reported in Table 2 (column 1) is that our 
key explanatory variable is likely endogenously determined, causing the estimate to be biased. 
Among possible sources of endogeneity, it directly follows from our theory that regulation works 
as an impediment to development by (7). This implies that the estimation of 1 in (18) is biased 
downwards. We address this issue by instrumenting for SDL. 
We rely on the model to find credible sources of exogenous variations in SDL that are not directly 
correlated with our regulatory measure WRLURI. Our identifying assumption for the SDL 
variable is that places endowed with desirable amenities and located on plains are developed 
earlier, attract more residents over time and, as a result, are more developed in our cross-section 
of MSAs, but that these characteristics are not directly related to regulatory restrictiveness. These 
predictions directly follow from Proposition 3 (i). Its first component is a demand factor: ceteris 
paribus, people prefer to live in nice places. We thus use a dummy variable that equals one if the 
MSA has a major border with a coastline and average temperatures in January as instruments 
for SDL. January temperatures should not have a direct and systematic influence on a broad index 
of residential land use regulations. However, the reader may worry that valuable ocean coasts 
                                                 
18 Throughout the paper the standard errors are clustered by state because the share of democratic votes is state-
specific.  
19 To ensure that our results may not be spurious, we include one explanatory variable at a time. We find that the 
OLS coefficient of SDL varies from 1.34 when only SDL and HOR are included to around 2 when we include the 
share Democrat votes variable. Thus, in addition to being an important explanation on its own, ideology is helpful in 
identifying the role of SDL. See Table U2 (not intended for publication) for details. 
20 See Table U7 (not intended for publication), Columns (1) to (3) for details. 
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require protection in the form of regulation. In practice, three properties of the WRLURI measure 
suggest that border with coast is a valid instrument. First, the WRLURI measure does not include 
attitudes towards regulation of coastal areas. Second, the majority of municipalities responding to 
the survey do not have access to the coast; this is true even for municipalities that belong to 
MSAs with access to the coast. Finally, federal regulations that may protect the coast are 
excluded from WRLURI by construction. We conduct additional robustness checks in Sections 
5.3 and 5.4. 
The second component of Proposition 3(ii) is a supply factor: it is simpler and cheaper to convert 
open land into developed land in plains. Hence, we use share of plains as an instrument for SDL. 
The way we define SDL in (17) is crucial for this to be part of a valid identification strategy. 
Indeed, some regulations may be designed purposely to protect some local amenities; Saiz (2010) 
shows how land use regulations correlate with the fraction of undeveloped land in an MSA. 
These plots, on which it is not practically feasible to build, are excluded from both the numerator 
and the denominator of (17). 
We also use historical population density from 1880 as an additional instrument for SDL. This is 
consistent with a dynamic interpretation of our model: desirable locations and plains attracted 
people early and were developed first, before land use regulations became part of the urban 
political life. This variable captures all the unobserved and time-invariant amenity and cost 
factors not already included in our set of instruments that lead people to settle in a specific place. 
It also captures historic amenity and cost factors that were important a long time ago and which 
started a dynamic development process of cities. They may no longer be important today and yet 
remain relevant because of inertia, durable housing, or the generation of agglomeration forces.  
These considerations lead us to run the following first stage regression by OLS:  
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    (19) 
where j is the error term. Our priors are 1 ,2 , 3 , 4 > 0. The results are reported in column 
(2) of Table 2. All coefficients have the expected sign and are significant beyond the five percent 
level with the exception of 3: share of plains is only weakly correlated with SDL. Nevertheless, 
the four instruments are jointly significant. Households obviously value access to the seafront and 
mild winter temperatures. The quantitative effects are strong: 21 granting a border with coast to a 
                                                 
21 We report quantitative effects for all our main specifications in Table U8 (not intended for publication). 
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hitherto landlocked MSA increases its share of developed land by 65.2% (+8.1 percentage 
points); an extra standard deviation in average January temperature and historical density are 
respectively associated with a 52.7% (+6.5 percentage points) and a 44.3% (+5.5 percentage 
points) increase in SDL. As to our set of controls, MSAs in the South have the lowest share of 
developed land and MSAs that command a high household average wage are more developed, 
consistent with the logic of our model of household location. These effects are statistically 
significant at the one percent level. The adjusted R2 is high with 0.59.  The second stage 
regression results of (18) with SDL being treated as the unique endogenous variable are reported 
in column (5) of Table 2. The TSLS coefficient of SDL is positive and significant at the five 
percent level. It is larger than the OLS coefficient of SDL, confirming the presence of a 
downward bias (we provide more direct evidence about this feedback/reverse-causation 
mechanism in Section 6). These findings provide both direct and indirect evidence consistent 
with our theory. The coefficients on the homeownership rate (HOR) and contemporaneous 
population density (POPD) remain insignificant. The findings that Democrat-leaning MSAs and 
those in the West prefer above average levels of regulation are very similar for our OLS and 
TSLS specifications.  
We conclude from these findings that the effect of SDL on regulation is well identified. The 
effect is also quantitatively meaningful. To fix ideas, compare Kansas City to San Francisco. The 
former has no access to coast, average January temperatures are 28.5°F, its share of developable 
land classified as plains is 63% and its historical population density is 52.3 people per km2. San 
Francisco has a border with the Pacific Ocean, January temperatures average 48.2°F, it has no 
county that is classified as a plain and its population density in 1880 was 239.6 people per km2. 
The implied difference in SDL is 16.3 percentage points (a full 1.6 standard deviations). This, in 
turn, implies a 1.05 standard deviation difference of WRLURI between the two MSAs. Kansas 
City is the 9th least regulated MSA in our sample (i.e. the 74th most regulated MSA). Granting it 
with San Francisco’s amenities and topography alone hypothetically makes it the 41st most 
regulated MSA (SF is the 16th most regulated MSA).  
The estimation of 2 in (18) may also be biased if there are omitted variables that are correlated 
with HOR or if land use regulations systematically influence the incentive to own one’s home. 
We use the MSA’s share of households that consist of married couples without children as a 
source of exogenous variation of HOR in order to improve the identification of its effect on 
WRLURI. Married couples without children tend to have higher and more stable household 
incomes and are able to accumulate greater wealth over time compared to married couples with 
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children. This makes them more likely to overcome liquidity and down-payment constraints and 
thus eases attaining homeownership. Moreover, married couples tend to be in more stable 
relationships compared to their unmarried counterparts, implying a longer expected duration in 
their property and, consequently, greater incentives to own rather than rent. By contrast, we do 
not expect the share of households that consists of married couples without children to help us 
identify the SDL. Our empirical results reported in column (3) of Table 2 are consistent with this 
prior; by contrast, the patterns of column (2) are unchanged or even reinforced. Column (4) 
reports OLS estimates of the effect of the share households with married couples and no children 
and the various controls on the homeownership rate. As predicted, the former is positive and 
highly statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Historical population density also helps us to 
identify the HOR; this finding makes sense because denser places have taller buildings and 
renting (rather than owning) is more efficient in multi-unit buildings. The adjusted R2 of 0.658 is 
high. The results contained in columns (2) to (4) thus establish that our proposed instruments for 
SDL and HOR fulfill the necessary condition for being valid instruments. 
The estimation of (18) with both SDL and HOR instrumented for are reported in Table 2, columns 
(6) to (8) (we additionally instrument for POPD in Section 5.2). Independent of whether we use 
the TSLS estimator (column 6), the Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) estimator 
(column 7) or the Jackknife (JIVE) estimator (column 8) we find that the coefficient of SDL is 
positive, statistically significant and larger than the OLS coefficient of column (1). These results 
confirm the presence of a downward bias in the OLS specification and reinforce our influential 
landowner hypothesis. We run the model using LIML because it is approximately median 
unbiased for over-identified models (we have five instruments and two endogenous explanatory 
variables) and produces a smaller bias than TSLS in finite samples. Since its asymptotic 
properties are the same as those of the TSLS estimator, we hope to find similar coefficients in the 
TSLS and LIML regressions as a rule of thumb (Angrist and Pischke 2009). We report the results 
of the regression using the JIVE estimator for further reference only, so we postpone further 
discussion of this estimation technique. The stability of the magnitude of the estimated 1 across 
columns (6) to (8) increases further our confidence in the robustness of our findings and 
strengthens our IV strategy. We also carry out the usual battery of tests that assess the validity of 
the instrumental variables, including over-identification tests as well as Hansen-J statistics and 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistics, and none of these tests indicates a problem at the usual 
confidence levels. Therefore, we do not report these results in order to save space. The last line of 
Table 2 reports Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistics, a test for weak instruments in the presence 
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of robust (clustered) standard errors. The test statistic in column (5) indicates with 95 percent 
confidence that the maximum TSLS size is just about 15%, implying that our instruments taken 
together are reasonably strong (Stock and Yogo 2005; Kleibergen and Paap 2006). The statistic in 
column (6) is much lower, raising concerns that our instruments might be weak in this case; this 
provides one additional motivation for replicating the analysis using LIML (the Kleibergen-Paap 
rk Wald F-statistic is the same but the critical values are lower than for TSLS). The result in this 
case is extremely strong: the reported statistic in column (7) is well above the critical value for a 
maximum LIML size of 10%. This vindicates our identification strategy. 
To summarize, the robust results so far are strongly supportive of various aspects of the 
influential landowner hypothesis. The theoretical predictions of Proposition 3(i) and (ii) are 
vindicated; the effect of regulation on SDL introduces a downward bias.  
5. Further specifications and alternative dataset 
We explore the sensitivity of our results to the set of instruments we include (Table 3), the set of 
endogenous variables we instrument for and the estimator we use (Table 4), the proxy we use for 
the relative influence of owners of developed land (Table 5), the inclusion of controls that capture 
preferences for protection of open space (Table 6) and the dataset and time period we use (Table 
7). 
5.1. Instruments  
In our baseline specification we instrument for SDL and HOR using five instruments. We 
replicate our baseline results in column (1) of Table 3 for convenience. The remaining columns in 
Table 3 report results for reduced sets of instruments. Panel A reports the first stage estimated 
coefficients of our instruments (the dependant variable is SDL) and Panels B and C respectively 
report the second stage TSLS and LIML coefficients of the share developed land, the 
homeownership rate and the population density in 1990. In columns (2) to (5), we replicate these 
estimations dropping one instrument at a time. In columns (6) to (11), we drop two instruments at 
a time. Inspection of the coefficients in Panel A reveals that border with coast, average 
temperatures in January and historical density are particularly helpful in our quest to identify the 
effect of SDL on WRLURI: they consistently have the expected sign, their magnitude is stable, 
and they are statistically significant at the one percent level (except average temperatures in 
January that sometimes ventures in the five percent zone). The effect of share plains on SDL is 
also positive and statistically significant throughout, though ‘only’ at the five or ten percent level. 
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Finally, the share of married couples without children (our excluded instrument for HOR) is 
uncorrelated to SDL throughout, as in our baseline specification. 
Turning to Panels B and C of Table 3, the striking result is that the effect of SDL on WRLURI is 
positive and statistically significant in nine cases out of ten: dropping both border with coast and 
share plains creates the only combination of instruments that yields a positive coefficient on SDL 
that marginally misses significance at the 10 percent level. Dropping either alone, however, or in 
combination of any other instrument, does identify the effect of SDL on WRLURI. The 
coefficients on HOR are stable but not statistically larger than zero (with one borderline 
exception). The coefficients on POPD remain statistically insignificant throughout. Ideology and 
regional dummies (not reported) remain stable and statistically significant. 
The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistics are in line with those of Table 2: the TSLS statistics 
fluctuate around the critical values of maximum TSLS sizes of 15% to 20%; the LIML statistics 
are all well above the critical value for a maximum LIML size of 10%.  
5.2. Endogenous Population Density  
In Table 4, we endogenize the POPD variable in addition to SDL and HOR. Various types of land 
use controls – including minimum lot size restrictions – differentially affect the population 
density, suggesting reversed causation and biased estimates. We expect two of our excluded 
instruments to be useful for identifying POPD. The first of these instruments is the share of 
plains in an MSA. The identifying assumption is that sprawl is easier in particularly flat areas, 
where it is particularly easy to build, leading us to expect a negative coefficient for share of 
plains when the dependant variable is POPD (in contrast to the SDL variable). The second 
instrument is historical MSA-level population density from 1880. We expect the MSAs that were 
densely populated in the 19th century (prior to the evolution of land use regulation in the United 
States) to have a densely populated developable area today. Column (3) shows that historical 
population density and share of plains both have the expected sign and are statistically 
significant. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 report results for the first stages of the variables SDL 
and HOR, respectively. The results are similar to the corresponding ones in Table 2 (columns 3 
and 4).  
The results of the second-stage using alternative estimators (TSLS, LIML, and JIVE), reported in 
columns (4) to (6), are equally supportive. Instrumenting simultaneously for SDL, HOR, and 
POPD systematically increases the point estimate of the second stage coefficient of SDL relative 
to the specifications with one or two instrumented variables in Table 2, columns (6) to (8). These 
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coefficients also remain statistically significant at the same confidence levels as their Table 2 
counterparts. The quantitative effect of SDL on WRLURI is also enlarged: a one standard 
deviation increase in SDL raises WRLURI by more than one third of a standard deviation; this is 
equivalent to a boost in the regulatory rate league table from the median (rank 47) to the top third. 
By contrast, the second stage coefficients of HOR and POPD remain statistically insignificant in 
all three specifications reported in columns (4) to (6).  
While we can calculate and report Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistics for our TSLS and LIML 
specifications to assess whether our instruments are jointly ‘weak’, critical values are not 
available from Stock and Yogo (2005) for specifications with more than two endogenous 
variables. To correct for the possible presence of weak instruments, we therefore also re-estimate 
(18) using a JIVE estimator (Angrist, Imbens and Krueger 1999). JIVE gets round the correlation 
between stage-one and stage-two errors by predicting the value of SDL of MSA j by running the 
first stage for j on all MSAs but j and repeating the procedure for all 93 cities in the sample (thus, 
the procedure has in a sense as many first stages as observations). As a result, this IV estimator 
bias is smaller than the TSLS bias but the standard errors are larger. The regression results of 
column (6) are consistent with these priors. The estimated coefficient for SDL using JIVE is of 
comparable magnitude to those of TSLS and LIML. This suggests that even if the instruments 
used to identify the endogenous variables were jointly weak the resulting bias would be small.  
The estimated coefficients on political ideology (share democratic votes) and the region dummies 
are stable and remain statistically significant.  
5.3. MSA boundaries and representative places 
To test the robustness of our results to the MSA definition, we redefine SDL so as to include only 
the land cover within a 20km radius from the centre of each MSA. It turns out that ‘more 
developed’ MSAs are more developed at any radius from the center than ‘less developed’ MSAs 
(see also Burchfield et al. 2006 on this), which leads us to expect our main results to be robust to 
this change. We also redefine SDL in various ways that include industrial land or exclude parks, 
or both. Finally, to immunize our results to the role of outlier places, we attribute to the MSA the 
SDL of its average or median place. We report the results of various combinations of these 
robustness checks in Table 5, columns (1) to (9). Column (10) replicates the whole analysis using 
the aggregate property value per m2 of developable land as the proxy variable for the relative 
influence of owners of developed land relative to that of owners of undeveloped land. This is the 
alternative, indirect measure that we use in Figure 1 (Panel c). Panels A, B and C respectively 
report the first stage, second stage TSLS and second stage LIML results. We instrument for both 
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SDL and HOR as in our baseline specification throughout; the results ought thus to be gauged 
against those of Table 2, columns (6) and (7). 
The results are again strongly in line with our baseline specification. The major access to coast 
and historical population density variables are positive and highly statistically significant in all 
specifications of Panel A. Aggregate property values are strongly and positively correlated with 
border with coast and average January temperatures, which is consistent with the finding that 
desirable amenities are at least partly capitalized into land prices (Gyourko et al. 2006). The 
second-stage results reported in Table 5 are equally bold. In all 18 reported specifications – using 
quite different definitions for SDL and two different estimation techniques – we find that SDL has 
a positive and statistically highly significant causal impact on WRLURI. The coefficient on 
aggregate property value in column (10) is also statistically positive at the ten percent level in 
both panels. Reassuringly, the coefficients on all variables are quite stable across specifications. 
We also replicate all the regressions in Table 5 endogenizing simultaneously for SDL, HOR and 
POPD. Our results come out even stronger: the point estimate of the coefficient of SDL rises in 
all twenty cases and it is statistically significant at the one percent level throughout Panel B and 
never below the five percent level throughout Panel C. By contrast, HOR is statistically 
significant in only three specifications out of ten and POPD is significant in none of them.22 
5.4. Protection of open space and regulation 
Local residents may turn against future development and opt for more restrictive land use 
regulations if open space becomes scarce in absolute terms (i.e. considering open space as a local 
public good) or in relative terms (i.e. allowing open space to be subject to crowding). To test that 
the effect of SDL on regulation is not driven by preferences for open space or conservationist 
motives, we re-estimate our baseline specifications with the total amount of open land 
(independent of whether the land is developable or not) in an MSA or the amount of open land in 
an MSA per capita as additional controls. Table 6 provides again strong support for our 
influential landowner hypothesis; adding the open space controls slightly increases the statistical 
significance and estimated coefficients on SDL. The evidence with respect to the open space 
hypothesis is mixed. Whereas in some of the TSLS-estimates the controls have the expected sign 
and are statistically significant, LIML and JIVE-estimates yield statistically insignificant results. 
These findings are in line with those reported in Table 5, where we find that adding or excluding 
                                                 
22 For details, see Table U3 (not intended for publication). 
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public parkland from the denominator of the SDL-measure does not alter our key findings in a 
meaningful way.  
5.5. The 1970/1980 sample 
As an ‘out-of-sample’ robustness check we apply our two-stage methodology to a different 
dataset and time period. The dependent variable of interest is the SAKS index of residential land 
use regulations, pertaining to the late 1970s/early 1980s. Our measure for SDL is derived from 
aerial photos taken in the mid 1970s. 
We regress (18) with SAKS replacing WRLURI. Table 7 (Panel A) reports the results. Turn to 
columns (1) to (3) for the first stage regressions. Interestingly, at that time land development 
seemed to be well explained by average January temperature and historical population density, 
whereas border with coast and share plains play a lesser role than in the 1992 data. The second 
stage regressions, reported in columns (4) to (7), provide again strong support for our influential 
landowner hypothesis. The estimated coefficient of SDL is stable across specifications (one or 
two endogenous variables) and estimators (TSLS and LIML). It is also statistically significant at 
the one percent level and quantitatively strong: one extra standard deviation in SDL raises SAKS 
by over two thirds of a standard deviation; this is equivalent to a boost in the regulatory rate 
league table from the median (rank 41) to the top quarter. This earlier data also provide no 
support for the homevoter hypothesis and the implications of the welfare economics view at the 
MSA level. Political ideology, as measured by the share democratic votes in the two preceding 
presidential elections, is seemingly unrelated to regulatory restrictiveness in the late 1970s and 
1980s. Finally, in line with our first stage findings, the Kleibergen-Paap statistics suggest that our 
instruments are weaker than in the baseline case. We thus re-run our regressions with the reduced 
set of statistically significant excluded instruments: average January temperature and historical 
population density.23 The estimated coefficients are stable and those on SDL remain significant at 
the one percent level; the Kleibergen-Paap statistic also increases, as expected. In short, with the 
exception of the role of ideology, the patterns that we have uncovered for the 1990/2000 data 
were already present in the 1970/1980 data. 
                                                 
23 See Panel A of Table U4 (not intended for publication). 
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5.6. Additional robustness checks  
We performed a variety of additional robustness checks. Since they reinforce our main results 
with only minor qualifications, we report them only briefly; also, we include the associated tables 
(not intended for publication) in this version of the paper for the sake of completeness. 
The contemporaneous sample of cities has 93 MSAs and the one pertaining to the late 1970s has 
81. Yet, only 63 MSAs are included in both samples. In Table U5, we replicate the simple OLS 
as well as the first stage and second stage TSLS and LIML results for both contemporaneous 
regulation (as measured by WRLURI) in Panel A and older regulation (as measured by SAKS) in 
Panel B. The striking result is that the key coefficients of the influential landowner hypothesis 
remain precisely estimated and of the correct sign, despite the sample size being quite small. This 
caveat bites only in producing relatively weak Kleibergen-Paap statistics.  
NYC and many Californian cities have rent controls. As these controls might affect the nature of 
the political economy game, we replicate our analysis excluding either or both sets of cities. 
Table U6 reports the first stage results (Panel A) and the OLS and second stage TSLS and LIML 
results (Panel B). It is readily verified that the influential landowner hypothesis finds strong and 
stable support throughout. Interestingly, the homevoter hypothesis now finds support in the TSLS 
and LIML specifications as well.  
Finally, we drop the explanatory variable share of democratic votes and re-run our central 
specification one more time. The results are reported in Table U7, columns (4) to (7). The 
estimated coefficients on SDL drop somewhat but remain statistically significant. Political 
ideology clearly reinforces the identification of the influential landowner hypothesis in addition 
to playing an important role on its own in explaining land use regulation patterns. 
6. Land use regulations and the supply of housing 
The workings of the economic mechanism central to our influential landowner hypothesis rests 
partly on the assumption that land use regulations increase the cost and reduce the quantity of 
further developments as per e.g. (7). To check whether this is a feature of the regulatory index in 
our data, we run the following with OLS:  
       , 0 1 , 2 , 1 ,( ) ( )H e Hj t j t j t j tg regulation g       (20) 
where ,
H
j tg  is the growth rate of the housing stock in MSA j between time period t and  t+1 (in 
number of housing units), , 1
H
j tg   is the equivalent growth rate between time period t-1 and t, 0 is 
the common trend, ,
e
j tregulation  is the estimated level of regulatory restrictiveness in MSA j at 
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time t, and j,t is the error term. We include , 1Hj tg   to allow for persistence in local housing 
markets. Our theoretical prior leads us to expect 1 < 0 by a dynamic version of (7). To reduce the 
importance of high frequency shocks, and for data availability reasons, we compute the growth 
rates over 10-year time periods. By this token, we will have to wait until 2020 to assess the effect 
of WRLURI on the ten-year growth of the housing stock. However, we can readily assess the 
effect of the (estimated) SAKS measure. 
We back out the fitted values for , ,
e e
j t j tregulation SAKS  from the estimations of Table 7, Panel 
A. We report the regression results for (20) in Panel B. Because the regulatory index measures 
are estimated values, we report bootstrapped (and robust) standard errors using 1,000 
replications. They are also in line with our priors: in all four specifications the predicted 
regulatory tax has a negative and statistically highly significant effect on the growth rate in 
housing supply in the 1990s. 24  An increase of the predicted SAKS index by one standard 
deviation reduces the growth rate of housing supply by 2.8 percentage points. This is equivalent 
to a drop in the growth rate league table from rank 41 to 54. Overall, our results in Table 7 imply 
that while more desirable MSAs grew more quickly in the past when little land was developed 
and regulation was lax, their growth rate has later slowed down significantly compared with less 
desirable MSAs. We attribute this effect to tighter land use controls. To fit the spirit of our linear 
model more closely, we also run (20) in first differences (results not reported), with no effect on 
the qualitative results that we report here. 
7. Concluding remarks 
Land use regulations vary tremendously in shape and scope across space and have become more 
widespread and stringent over time. They impose – via increasing housing costs – an enormous 
gross cost on households. Understanding the effects and causes of these regulations is thus of 
primary economic policy importance. Yet, perhaps because a large part of these costs are indirect, 
this area of research remains relatively under-explored. 
Our study contributes to the understanding of political economics considerations that shape land 
use restrictions. We focus exclusively on residential land use by the nature of the regulatory data 
available. In practice, zoning also separates incompatible land uses and the business districts from 
residential areas. With this caveat in mind, our results point to land-based-interests explanations 
                                                 
24 The qualitative results go unaltered if we use only average January temperature and historical density in our set of 
excluded instruments. See Panel B in Table U4 (not intended for publication). 
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and suggest that the tightness of residential land use regulations goes beyond welfare economics 
considerations. Thus, the outcome is suboptimal. Specifically, regulation in highly desirable and 
highly developed places like New York City and San Francisco may be grossly over-restrictive 
while less attractive metro areas may be too little regulated. As a result, too few people appear to 
be living in the desirable and productive cities and too many people may be living in less 
desirable places relative to the social optimum.  
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Summary Statistics and Regression Tables 
Table 1 
Summary statistics 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Wharton regulatory index (WRLURI), 2005 a) 93 0.117 0.702 -1.25 2.07 
Homeownership rate, 1990 b) 93 0.628 0.070 0.325 0.739 
Developed residential land as % of developable non-industrial land 
(“share developed residential”), 1992 c) 
93 0.124 0.122 0.0119 0.761 
Alternative measures for robustness checks      
Share developed (incl. industrial developments), 1992 c) 93 0.154 0.134 0.0198 0.847 
Share developed, 20km radius, 1992 c) 93 0.363 0.208 0.0580 1 
Share developed residential, 20km radius, 1992 c) 93 0.309 0.204 0.0436 1 
Share developed, excluding parks, 1992 c) 93 0.149 0.139 0.0204 1 
Share developed residential, excluding parks, 1992 c) 93 0.121 0.132 0.0124 1 
Share developed of average place, 1992 c) 93 0.462 0.164 0.0976 1 
Share developed residential of average place, 1992 c) 93 0.419 0.168 0.0822 1 
Share developed of median place, 1992 c) 93 0.463 0.188 0.0947 1 
Share developed residential of median place, 1992 c) 93 0.414 0.190 0.0793 1 
 Aggregate property value per m2 of developable land, 1990 b) 93 17.9 35.4 1.3 237.5 
Population density in developed residential area (per m2), 1990 d) 93 0.00264 0.00125 0.00116 0.0107 
%Democratic votes in state, av. presidential elections 1988/92 e) 93 48.8 4.9 34.4 58.8 
Average household wage, 1990 b) 93 30.0 5.2 17.0 46.5 
Region = Midwest (omitted) f) 93 0.215 0.413 0 1 
Region = North East f) 93 0.183 0.389 0 1 
Region = South f) 93 0.376 0.487 0 1 
Region = West f) 93 0.226 0.420 0 1 
Metro area has major border with coast f) 93 0.247 0.434 0 1 
Average temperature in January, measured between 1941-1970 g) 93 38.2 12.5 11.8 67.2 
Share land in topography classification that consists of plains g) 93 0.546 0.432 0 1 
Population density in metro area (per m2), 1880 i), x 10-6 93 125.5 490.3 0.1 4698.6 
% Households with married couples and no children, 1990 b) 93 0.291 0.028 0.236 0.427 
Total open land in MSA in thousand km2  93 9.11 12.89 0.0436 102.2 
Total open land in MSA in km2 per person 93 0.00915 0.0152 0.0000789 0.138 
Saks-index of housing supply regulation (SAKS), late 1970s/80s h) 81 0.00544 0.997 -2.399 2.211 
Homeownership rate, 1980 b)  81 0.636 0.0739 0.278 0.764 
Developed residential land as % of developable land, 1976 c) 81 0.118 0.104 0.0119 0.501 
Population density in the developed area (per m2), 1980 d) 81 0.00231 0.00113 0.000254 0.00896 
%Democratic votes in state, av. presidential elections 1972/76 e) 81 43.8 3.1 31.6 51.9 
Average household wage, 1980 b) 81 16.0 2.4 9.2 22.0 
Region = Midwest (omitted) f) 81 0.210 0.410 0 1 
Region = North East f) 81 0.160 0.369 0 1 
Region = South f) 81 0.383 0.489 0 1 
Region = West f) 81 0.247 0.434 0 1 
Metro area has major border with coast f) 81 0.284 0.454 0 1 
Average temperature in January, measured between 1941-1970 g) 81 39.4 12.8 11.8 67.2 
Share land in topography classification that consists of plains g) 81 0.534 0.431 0 1 
Population density in metro area (per km2), 1880 i) 81 75.3 110.0 0.0278 647.7 
% Households with married couples and no children, 1990 b) 81 0.299 0.0357 0.203 0.451 
Percent change, housing units, 1990-2000 b) 81 0.135 0.0874 0.0266 0.484 
Percent change, housing units, 1980-1990 b) 81 0.207 0.154 0.0134 0.637 
Sources: a) Saiz (2008); b) US Census and Neighborhood Community Database (NCDB); c) National Land Cover Data (NLCD) 
1976 and 1992 from the U.S. Geological Survey; Missing map cells for 1976 were obtained from Diego Puga at 
http://diegopuga.org/data/sprawl/. Map data was unavailable for Santa Cruz, California and a mis-projected map for Erie, 
Pennsylvania necessitated the removal of fourteen affected census tracts; d) Derived from NLCD and NCDB; e) Dave Leip’s 
Atlas of Presidential Elections; f) Derived from ESRI’s Census 2000 MSA-level shape file; g) Natural Amenity Scale Data from 
the Economic Research Service, United States Department of Agriculture; h) Saks (2008); i) Interuniversity Consortium for 
Political and Social research (ICPSR) study #2896. Measure is based on historical MSA boundary definitions. 
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Table 2 
Base specification: Determinants of restrictiveness of land use regulations (N=93) 
 
  First-stage Second-stage 
 OLS TSLS TSLS LIML JIVE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent: WRLURI SDL 1992 SDL 1992 HOR 1990 WRLURI WRLURI WRLURI WRLURI 
Share developed residential land (SDL), 1992 1.981***    1.993** 2.299** 2.372** 2.599* 
(0.512)    (0.953) (0.911) (0.985) (1.424) 
Homeownership rate (HOR), 1990 0.594 -0.221   0.599 3.674 4.248* 10.25* 
(0.977) (0.175)   (0.842) (2.275) (2.556) (5.958) 
Population density in developed residential area 
(POPD), 1990 
-48.29 -3.480 0.207 -6.623 -48.69 42.35 58.58 253.5 
(75.63) (9.956) (13.22) (12.74) (83.91) (106.1) (114.0) (236.1) 
Share democratic votes in state,  
average 1988 and 1992 
0.0429** -0.00254 -0.00232 -0.000687 0.0429** 0.0463** 0.0471** 0.0514** 
(0.0196) (0.00262) (0.00255) (0.00140) (0.0192) (0.0195) (0.0199) (0.0246) 
Household wage (in thousand dollar), 1990 0.0167 0.00307*** 0.00346*** -0.000953 0.0167 0.0229 0.0240 0.0373* 
(0.0141) (0.00101) (0.00116) (0.00117) (0.0138) (0.0165) (0.0172) (0.0218) 
Region = Northeast 0.458* 0.0338 0.0389 -0.0271 0.457* 0.486** 0.490** 0.577* 
(0.253) (0.0227) (0.0247) (0.0178) (0.237) (0.227) (0.228) (0.291) 
Region = South 0.323* -0.109*** -0.104*** -0.00546 0.323** 0.436*** 0.457*** 0.691** 
(0.168) (0.0314) (0.0326) (0.0145) (0.159) (0.169) (0.173) (0.289) 
Region = West 0.833*** -0.0808* -0.0706 -0.0315 0.833*** 0.991*** 1.020*** 1.334*** 
(0.169) (0.0448) (0.0435) (0.0218) (0.159) (0.206) (0.217) (0.354) 
Metro area has major border with coast  0.0786*** 0.0809*** -0.0207*     
 (0.0227) (0.0219) (0.0114)     
Average temperature in January, 1941-1970  0.00510** 0.00523*** -0.00101     
 (0.00189) (0.00189) (0.000674)     
Share metro area that is classified as consisting of 
plains 
 0.0201 0.0220 9.63e-07     
 (0.0148) (0.0143) (0.0138)     
Population density in 1880  105*** 112*** -4.04e-05*     
 (18.2) (22.) (2.18e-05)     
Share households with married couples and no 
children in 1990 
  -0.147 1.324***     
  (0.350) (0.263)     
Constant -3.361** 0.119 -0.0214 0.384*** -3.368*** -6.011*** -6.508*** -11.60** 
(1.429) (0.197) (0.214) (0.141) (1.284) (2.214) (2.463) (5.249) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.377 0.594 0.586 0.658     
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic     12.0 5.6 5.6  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (observations are clustered by US state). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bold coefficients are instrumented. 
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Table 3 
Robustness check: Drop one instrument or any combination of two instruments at a time (N=93) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 PANEL A: First-stage / Dependent variable: Share developed residential land (SDL), 1992 
Excluded instruments: Baseline Drop one excluded instrument at a time Drop two excluded instruments at a time 
Major border with coast 0.0809***  0.110*** 0.0838*** 0.0796***    0.117*** 0.105*** 0.0862*** 
(0.0219)  (0.0351) (0.0220) (0.0257)    (0.0386) (0.0368) (0.0263) 
Average January 
temperature 
0.00523*** 0.00639***  0.00541*** 0.00447**  0.00674*** 0.00563**   0.00479** 
(0.00189) (0.00229)  (0.00194) (0.00199)  (0.00242) (0.00237)   (0.00208) 
Share plains 0.0220 0.0334** 0.0394*  0.0470** 0.0620*  0.0580**  0.0588**  
(0.0143) (0.0163) (0.0232)  (0.0199) (0.0354)  (0.0218)  (0.0255)  
Population density in 1880 112*** 111*** 95*** 118***  87*** 121***  105***   
(22.3) (25.1) (23.3) (22.9)  (30.3) (26.4)  (22.4)   
Share married and no 
children 
-0.147 0.178 0.202 -0.220 0.119 0.799 0.0843 0.438 0.0905 0.389 -0.0132 
(0.350) (0.454) (0.319) (0.354) (0.377) (0.606) (0.474) (0.485) (0.331) (0.355) (0.412) 
Other controls and constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.586 0.534 0.499 0.587 0.507 0.392 0.531 0.458 0.492 0.445 0.494 
 PANEL B: Second-stage / TSLS / Dependent variable: WRLURI 
Share developed residential 
land (SDL) 
2.299** 1.963** 2.962** 2.114** 2.865*** 2.869** 1.604 2.566** 2.598** 3.805*** 2.463*** 
(0.911) (0.994) (1.186) (0.921) (0.940) (1.369) (1.074) (1.064) (1.155) (1.340) (0.953) 
Homeownership rate 
(HOR) 
3.674 3.947* 3.395 3.563 2.800 3.453 3.939 3.102 3.384 2.259 3.082 
(2.275) (2.319) (2.211) (2.329) (2.445) (2.246) (2.408) (2.494) (2.268) (2.496) (2.423) 
Population density in 
developed residential area 
42.35 67.28 2.013 47.13 -13.87 8.301 83.66 10.32 18.55 -76.06 14.47 
(106.1) (102.8) (121.1) (105.0) (126.9) (123.6) (100.5) (126.1) (118.7) (149.8) (119.4) 
Share democratic votes 0.0463** 0.0444** 0.0503** 0.0451** 0.0494*** 0.0498** 0.0421** 0.0477** 0.0480** 0.0550*** 0.0471** 
(0.0195) (0.0199) (0.0196) (0.0197) (0.0187) (0.0199) (0.0205) (0.0188) (0.0200) (0.0191) (0.0192) 
Other controls and constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Kleibergen-Paap statistic 5.6 7.4 12.4 6.9 11.2 6.6 9.8 7.5 16.4 8.2 12.4 
 PANEL C: Second-stage / LIML / Dependent variable: WRLURI 
Share developed residential 
land (SDL) 
2.372** 1.962* 3.081** 2.128** 2.962*** 3.007* 1.604 2.608** 2.619** 3.872*** 2.478** 
(0.985) (1.082) (1.315) (0.944) (1.036) (1.708) (1.075) (1.197) (1.188) (1.403) (0.987) 
Homeownership rate 
(HOR) 
4.248* 4.448* 3.719 3.739 3.079 3.764 3.941 3.406 3.477 2.288 3.203 
(2.556) (2.565) (2.379) (2.419) (2.683) (2.485) (2.409) (2.755) (2.315) (2.561) (2.506) 
Population density in 
developed residential area 
58.58 84.49 7.540 52.48 -8.812 12.52 83.76 18.78 20.70 -78.16 17.88 
(114.0) (110.7) (128.6) (107.5) (137.2) (143.5) (100.5) (139.1) (120.9) (154.0) (122.9) 
Share democratic votes 0.0471** 0.0446** 0.0512** 0.0453** 0.0502*** 0.0508** 0.0421** 0.0481** 0.0482** 0.0555*** 0.0472** 
(0.0199) (0.0204) (0.0200) (0.0198) (0.0189) (0.0209) (0.0205) (0.0191) (0.0201) (0.0193) (0.0193) 
Other controls and constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Kleibergen-Paap statistic 5.6 7.4 12.4 6.9 11.2 6.6 9.8 7.5 16.4 8.2 12.4 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (observations are clustered by US state). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bold coefficients are instrumented. 
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Table 4 
Robustness check: Endogenize population density in developed residential area (N=93) 
 
 First-stage Second-stage TSLS LIML JIVE 
Dependent variable: SDL HOR PDDR WRLURI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Share developed residential land 
(SDL) 
   3.114*** 3.432** 3.185* 
   (0.939) (1.372) (1.634) 
Homeownership rate (HOR)    0.618 -0.188 4.846 
   (3.802) (5.885) (7.876) 
Population density in developed 
residential area (POPD) 
   -185.6 -252.8 -17.36 
   (216.3) (355.8) (424.8) 
Share democratic votes -0.00232 -0.000785 1.47e-05 0.0502*** 0.0518*** 0.0526*** 
(0.00251) (0.00136) (1.66e-05) (0.0179) (0.0182) (0.0194) 
Household wage (in thousand 
dollar) 
0.00346*** -0.000866 -1.31e-05 0.0155 0.0133 0.0244 
(0.00118) (0.00113) (1.82e-05) (0.0188) (0.0237) (0.0213) 
Region = Northeast 0.0389 -0.0265 -9.34e-05 0.437* 0.418 0.484* 
(0.0246) (0.0165) (0.000289) (0.243) (0.265) (0.262) 
Region = South -0.104*** -0.000763 -0.000708** 0.269 0.221 0.442 
(0.0321) (0.0158) (0.000262) (0.227) (0.322) (0.407) 
Region = West -0.0706 -0.0294 -0.000307 0.847*** 0.808** 1.059** 
(0.0433) (0.0221) (0.000264) (0.231) (0.316) (0.426) 
Major border with coast 0.0810*** -0.0244 0.000558**    
(0.0231) (0.0153) (0.000258)    
Average January temperature 0.00523*** -0.00112* 1.66e-05*    
(0.00187) (0.000642) (9.44e-06)    
Share plains 0.0219 0.00300 -0.000453**    
(0.0148) (0.0127) (0.000212)    
Population density in 1880 113*** -51*** 1.6***    
(9.8) (5.9) (.11)    
Share married and no children -0.150 1.427*** -0.0155***    
(0.307) (0.270) (0.00398)    
Constant -0.0200 0.342** 0.00646*** -3.456 -2.796 -7.069 
(0.206) (0.138) (0.00156) (3.469) (5.202) (6.579) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.591 0.657 0.672    
Kleibergen-Paap statistic    2.0 2.0  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (observations are clustered by US state). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bold 
coefficients are instrumented. 
 
39
Table 5 
Robustness check: Use alternative measures to proxy for relative influence of owners of developed land (N=93) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 PANEL A: First stage / Dependent variable: Alternative proxy measures for the relative influence of owners of developed land 
 Alternative measures of share developed land (SDL) Aggr. property 
value per m2 
developable 
land 
 Developed 
residential + 
industrial 
20 km radius, 
residential + 
industrial 
20 km radius, 
residential 
only 
Excluding 
parkland,  
res. + ind. 
Excluding 
parkland, 
res. only 
Average place 
in MSA,  
res. + ind. 
Av. place in 
MSA,  
res. only 
Median place 
in MSA,  
res. + ind. 
Median place 
in MSA,  
res. only 
Major border with coast 0.0896*** 0.127** 0.120** 0.102*** 0.0932*** 0.107*** 0.110*** 0.113** 0.121*** 21.33** 
(0.0236) (0.0563) (0.0536) (0.0284) (0.0275) (0.0392) (0.0387) (0.0452) (0.0443) (8.653) 
Average January 
temperature 
0.00557*** 0.00622 0.00694 0.00619* 0.00614* 0.00606* 0.00684** 0.00735** 0.00785** 0.749*** 
(0.00203) (0.00445) (0.00444) (0.00322) (0.00314) (0.00320) (0.00337) (0.00338) (0.00360) (0.225) 
Share plains 0.0244 0.0725 0.0763 0.0227 0.0219 0.0523* 0.0450 0.0717* 0.0615 -3.828 
(0.0165) (0.0525) (0.0517) (0.0200) (0.0174) (0.0301) (0.0306) (0.0392) (0.0386) (4.819) 
Population density in 1880 115*** 141*** 163*** 60** 61** 130*** 148*** 127*** 147*** 28,700*** 
(22.6) (48.5) (50.6) (24.) (23.2) (34.8) (36.9) (43.1) (46.6) (8,820) 
Other controls and constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.579 0.242 0.278 0.376 0.357 0.322 0.359 0.325 0.357 0.755 
 PANEL B: Second-stage / Dependent variable: WRLURI / TSLS 
Share developed residential 
land (SDL) 
2.205*** 2.115*** 1.875*** 2.184*** 2.217*** 1.770*** 1.586*** 1.556*** 1.416*** 0.0105* 
(0.852) (0.768) (0.686) (0.797) (0.807) (0.642) (0.591) (0.564) (0.530) (0.00614) 
Homeownership rate (HOR) 3.797 5.485** 5.055** 3.469 3.332 2.926 2.883 2.676 2.607 4.118* 
(2.324) (2.277) (2.325) (2.397) (2.352) (2.091) (2.070) (2.111) (2.108) (2.371) 
Population density in 
developed residential area 
38.37 106.4 105.5 65.44 69.49 72.93 74.21 72.02 71.52 -40.17 
(108.0) (110.3) (110.4) (105.5) (103.7) (101.8) (101.8) (101.1) (102.3) (138.5) 
Share democratic votes 0.0483** 0.0498** 0.0467** 0.0500** 0.0474** 0.0438** 0.0413** 0.0473** 0.0437** 0.0455** 
(0.0198) (0.0215) (0.0208) (0.0204) (0.0198) (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0199) (0.0201) (0.0215) 
Other controls and constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Kleibergen-Paap statistic 4.9 4.4 5.4 2.8 2.7 8.9 12.3 8.9 11.6 8.4 
 PANEL C: Second-stage / Dependent variable: WRLURI / LIML 
Share developed residential 
land (SDL) 
2.289** 2.323** 2.054** 2.309** 2.344** 1.897*** 1.690** 1.665*** 1.513*** 0.0122* 
(0.924) (0.911) (0.799) (0.923) (0.935) (0.721) (0.657) (0.622) (0.583) (0.00687) 
Homeownership rate (HOR) 4.377* 6.040** 5.629** 4.046 3.902 3.257 3.255 2.934 2.887 4.977* 
(2.604) (2.425) (2.487) (2.667) (2.615) (2.262) (2.263) (2.263) (2.281) (2.648) 
Population density in 
developed residential area 
53.82 115.1 116.5 80.81 85.13 80.60 83.83 77.85 78.28 -42.83 
(115.9) (114.4) (115.4) (114.0) (112.1) (107.5) (108.3) (106.5) (108.4) (153.5) 
Share democratic votes 0.0492** 0.0517** 0.0484** 0.0513** 0.0486** 0.0448** 0.0422** 0.0485** 0.0447** 0.0480** 
(0.0203) (0.0223) (0.0213) (0.0211) (0.0204) (0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0200) (0.0202) (0.0223) 
Other controls and constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Kleibergen-Paap statistic 4.9 4.4 5.4 2.8 2.7 8.9 12.3 8.9 11.6 8.4 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (observations are clustered by US state). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bold coefficients are instrumented. 
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Table 6 
Additional robustness checks: Base specification but with controls for total open land or open land per capita (N=93) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Dependent variable: WRLURI 
 TSLS TSLS LIML JIVE TSLS TSLS LIML JIVE 
Share developed residential land 
(SDL), 1992 
1.946** 2.325** 2.452** 2.921* 1.883** 2.373** 2.532** 3.027* 
(0.926) (0.909) (1.010) (1.643) (0.951) (0.947) (1.062) (1.828) 
Homeownership rate (HOR), 1990 0.288 3.758* 4.562* 12.02 0.106 4.012* 4.884* 11.92* 
(0.746) (2.255) (2.621) (8.051) (0.781) (2.223) (2.578) (6.965) 
Population density in developed 
residential area (POPD), 1990 
-66.56 38.02 60.55 300.8 -72.37 45.09 69.14 297.6 
(81.28) (106.9) (117.2) (307.0) (82.04) (106.0) (115.8) (278.6) 
Share democratic votes in state, 
average 1988 and 1992 
0.0405** 0.0453** 0.0466** 0.0546* 0.0381** 0.0452** 0.0471** 0.0571** 
(0.0192) (0.0200) (0.0206) (0.0276) (0.0194) (0.0203) (0.0211) (0.0275) 
Household wage (in thousand 
dollar), 1990 
0.0155 0.0226 0.0241 0.0405 0.0121 0.0218 0.0238 0.0420 
(0.0144) (0.0173) (0.0182) (0.0260) (0.0137) (0.0171) (0.0181) (0.0262) 
Region = Northeast 0.454* 0.485** 0.489** 0.582* 0.474** 0.494** 0.494** 0.562* 
(0.233) (0.223) (0.226) (0.321) (0.234) (0.226) (0.230) (0.313) 
Region = South 0.305* 0.434*** 0.463*** 0.752** 0.295* 0.442*** 0.473*** 0.750** 
(0.159) (0.168) (0.174) (0.364) (0.159) (0.166) (0.172) (0.333) 
Region = West 0.908*** 1.051*** 1.083*** 1.403*** 0.916*** 1.055*** 1.084*** 1.352*** 
(0.170) (0.208) (0.218) (0.397) (0.170) (0.203) (0.213) (0.339) 
Total open land in MSA in 
thousand km2 
-0.00744** -0.00469* -0.00401 0.00153     
(0.00360) (0.00250) (0.00259) (0.00784)     
Total open land in MSA in km2
per person 
    -7.217*** -3.259 -2.294 4.204 
    (2.646) (2.916) (3.243) (7.470) 
Constant -2.906** -5.966*** -6.684** -13.19* -2.557** -6.140*** -6.953*** -13.30** 
(1.199) (2.270) (2.606) (7.236) (1.254) (2.298) (2.636) (6.436) 
Kleibergen-Paap statistic 19.0 5.2 5.2  12.1 5.1 5.1  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (observations are clustered by US state). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bold coefficients are instrumented. 
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Table 7 
Robustness Check: Use data on land use and regulation from late 1970s/early 1980s and explain growth rate in housing supply (N=81) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
PANEL A: First-stage and second-stage results (Explaining restrictiveness of land use regulation) 
OLS (First-stage) TSLS LIML TSLS LIML 
Dependent variables:: SDL 76 SDL 76 HOR 80 SAKS Regulatory Index 
Share developed residential land, 1976 (SDL 76)    6.851*** 7.506*** 6.437*** 6.824*** 
   (1.450) (1.704) (1.492) (1.597) 
Homeownership rate, 1980 (HOR 80) -0.113   -0.724 -0.568 -3.269 -3.281 
(0.121)   (1.997) (2.076) (2.372) (2.424) 
Population density in developed residential area, 1980 1.534 4.425 -9.262 -26.81 -43.18 -96.34 -109.4 
(11.63) (12.20) (7.434) (130.3) (134.4) (147.3) (152.2) 
Share democratic votes in state, average 1972 and 1976 -0.00224 -0.00151 -0.00248 0.0245 0.0267 0.00936 0.0101 
(0.00315) (0.00314) (0.00156) (0.0294) (0.0294) (0.0296) (0.0296) 
Major border with coast 0.0314 0.0301 -0.0265     
(0.0265) (0.0226) (0.0160)     
Average January temperature 0.00451** 0.00440** -0.00172*     
(0.00175) (0.00176) (0.000908)     
Share plains 0.0388 0.0355 0.0186     
(0.0427) (0.0428) (0.0154)     
Population density in 1880 0.000316** 0.000365*** -0.000261***     
(0.000129) (0.000116) (8.78e-05)     
Share married and no children  0.145 1.203***     
 (0.220) (0.298)     
Other controls (incl. household wage) and constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.307 0.305 0.642     
Kleibergen-Paap statistic    4.2 4.2 3.6 3.6 
    PANEL B: Explaining growth rate in housing supply 
Dependent variable:    Percent change in housing units 1990 to 2000 
Predicted Saks-Index of Housing Supply Regulation    -0.0310*** -0.0293*** -0.0280*** -0.0271*** 
   (0.00882) (0.00826) (0.00890) (0.00898) 
Percent change, housing units, 1980-1990    0.364*** 0.364*** 0.360*** 0.360*** 
   (0.0810) (0.0825) (0.0897) (0.0855) 
Constant    0.0600*** 0.0600*** 0.0608*** 0.0608*** 
   (0.0133) (0.0140) (0.0149) (0.0139) 
Adjusted R-squared    0.468 0.467 0.453 0.453 
Notes for both Panels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bold coefficients are instrumented. Notes for Panel A: Robust standard errors in parentheses (obs. are clustered by US state). 
Region fixed effects and constant included (yes). Notes for Panel B: Standard errors are (robust) bootstrap standard errors (using 1000 bootstrap replications and clustering by US state.) 
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 Figures 
Figure 1. Regulatory restrictiveness and potential determinants. 
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Figure 2. Spatial equilibrium. 
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Appendix A. Proofs of Propositions 
Proof of Proposition 1. By inspection, the RHS of (6) is decreasing in Hj and it belongs to the 
unit interval for any [0, ]jH H  (with complementary slackness), so there always exists a 
jurisidction j such that a positive mass of households desires to live in j. Conversely, the LHS of 
(6) is linearly increasing in Hj and it spans over the unit interval, all [0, ]jH H . It follows that 
there exists at least one j  such that the LHS and the RHS intersect exactly once in the 
interior of the unit interval; in general, the LHS and the RHS intersect at most once for any 
k . QED. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Since the (necessary) second order condition (15) holds for any vector of 
taxes t, it is also sufficient to ensure that t0 in (13) characterizes the unique SPE of the game and 
that this equilibrium exists. QED. 
Proofs of Proposition 3 and Corollaries 3.1 and 3.2. The proofs of Proposition 3 and Corollary 
3.1 follow by inspection of (13) and (14). We now lay out the algorithm that we use to derive 
these expressions, which is also helpful to build the intuition for these results. It is convenient to 
start with (iii). Using (10), Rj is increasing at 0jt   by (11) and ( )jR   is concave by (15). Also, 
0 (0, )jH H  by (16). Thus 0 0jt  . Then (ii) immediately follows from (12). Next turn to (i). 
Since (12) holds for all j it must also hold for the average jurisdiction: 0 (1 ) /jt H    . Using 
this, (7) and (12) into gives (13) and (14), from which (i) follows. Then (iv) follows from the fact 
that the coefficient of ( )j   in (13) belongs to the interior of the unit interval. (v) is a 
corollary of (iv) by (8). Part (vi) follows by inspection of 0 (1 ) / ( ) / ( 1)jt H J H J         . 
(vii) It follows from (13) that the variance of 0jt  is equal to  
2
0 1Var( ) Var( )
12
j jt
J
 

       
, 
which is decreasing in  and hence decreasing in H  by (11). QED. 
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Appendix B.  Appendix Tables not intended for publication 
Table U1 (not intended for publication) 
MSA-level rankings of measures of regulatory restrictiveness and land scarcity 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
Metropolitan Area 
Regulatory Tax 
in % of  
House Value 
1998 i) Rank 
Regulatory 
Index 2005 
ii) Rank
Regulatory 
Index  
late 1970s 
& 1980s ii) Rank 
Share 
Developed 
Land in %  
1992 iii) Rank 
Share 
Developed 
Land in% 
1976 iii) Rank 
San Francisco  53.1 1 0.78 5 2.10 2 20.8 10 25.4 8 
San Jose  46.9 2 0.21 10 1.65 3 19.9 12 25.2 9 
Los Angeles  33.9 3 0.50 8 1.21 4 44.2 1 54.7 1 
Oakland  32.1 4 0.63 7 0.10 14 26.6 5 27.6 6 
Washington, D.C.  21.9 5 0.21 10 0.86 6 10.2 17 16.1 16 
Newport News, VA  20.7 6 0.12 12  (-) 17.5 13 20.5 14 
Boston  18.6 7 1.67 2 0.86 7 33.2 4 33.9 3 
New York  12.2 8 0.67 6 2.21 1 43.9 2 50.7 2 
Manhattan >50          
Salt Lake City  11.9 9 -0.03 17 0.96 5 23.3 6 28.8 4 
Chicago  5.7 10 0.01 16 -1.01 20 22.4 7 26.2 7 
Baltimore 1.8 11 1.65 3 0.80 8 14.2 15 18.3 15 
Birmingham  0 12 -0.24 18 -0.46 16 4.8 21 7.5 21 
Cincinnati  0 12 -0.58 21 0.16 12 9.3 18 14.8 18 
Detroit  0 12 0.07 14 -0.69 19 22.3 8 22.9 11 
Houston  0 12 -0.30 20 -0.52 17 14.8 14 12.3 19 
Minneapolis  0 12 0.38 9 -0.16 15 11.1 16 9.4 20 
Philadelphia  0 12 1.13 4 0.47 9 21.1 9 27.8 5 
Pittsburgh  0 12 0.08 13 0.26 11 8.5 19 15.4 17 
Providence  0 12 2.07 1 0.35 10 20.6 11 22.2 12 
Rochester  0 12 0.04 15 -0.68 18 5.3 20 21.8 13 
Tampa 0 12 -0.24 18 0.16 13 35.6 3 24.2 10 
Pair: Correlation  
Rank 
Correlation   Correlation  
Rank  
Correlation 
HOR 1990, (4) -0.61  -0.44  (2), HOR 1990 -0.24  -0.32  
HOR 1980, (5) -0.69  -0.39  (3), HOR 1980 -0.64  -0.45  
(1), (2) 0.12  0.37  (1), (4)  0.33  0.36  
(1), (3) 0.68  0.65  (2), (4)  0.28  0.31  
(1), HOR 1990 -0.52  -0.68  (3), (5)  0.50  0.34  
Sources: i) Estimated regulatory tax values are from Glaeser et al. (2005a). ii) Regulatory index values are from Saiz (2008) 
and Saks (2008 respectively. iii) The share developed land measures are derived from the 1992 and 1976 National Land 
Cover Data. Homeownership rates (HOR) are from the 1990 and 1980 US Census (tract level data geographically matched 
to the metropolitan area level). 
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Table U2  (not intended for publication) 
Relationship between land scarcity and restrictiveness of land use regulations (N=93) 
Method: OLS 
  
 Dependent Variable: WRLURI from 2005 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Share developed, 1992 
(SDL) 
1.778*** 1.340** 1.411** 2.018*** 1.950*** 1.950*** 1.981*** 
(0.598) (0.621) (0.554) (0.498) (0.555) (0.555) (0.512) 
Homeownership rate, 
1990 (HOR) 
 -1.729* -1.976 -1.296 -1.045 -1.045 0.594 
 (0.969) (1.249) (1.083) (1.140) (1.140) (0.977) 
Population density in 
developed area, 1990 
  -26.56 -82.67 -78.23 -78.23 -48.29 
  (84.99) (80.12) (82.71) (82.71) (75.63) 
Share democratic votes in 
state, average 1988/1992 
   0.0625*** 0.0586*** 0.0586*** 0.0429** 
   (0.0180) (0.0189) (0.0189) (0.0196) 
Household wage (in 
thousand US dollar), 1990 
    0.0145 0.0145 0.0167 
    (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0141) 
North East       0.458* 
      (0.253) 
South       0.323* 
      (0.168) 
West       0.833*** 
       (0.169) 
Constant -0.104 1.036 1.252 -2.155* -2.557** -2.557** -3.361** 
(0.101) (0.628) (0.962) (1.260) (1.258) (1.258) (1.429) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.086 0.100 0.092 0.259 0.261 0.261 0.377 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (observations are clustered by US state). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table U3  (not intended for publication) 
Robustness check: Replicate Table 5 but with 3 endogenous variables (N=93) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 PANEL A: First stage / Dependent variable: Alternative proxy measures for the relative influence of owners of developed land 
 Alternative measures of share developed land (SDL) Aggr. property 
value per m2 
developable 
land 
 Developed 
residential + 
industrial 
20 km radius, 
residential + 
industrial 
20 km radius, 
residential 
only 
Excluding 
parkland,  
res. + ind. 
Excluding 
parkland, 
res. only 
Average place 
in MSA,  
res. + ind. 
Av. place in 
MSA,  
res. only 
Median place 
in MSA,  
res. + ind. 
Median place 
in MSA,  
res. only 
Major border with coast 0.0913*** 0.115** 0.105* 0.102*** 0.0914*** 0.0957** 0.0967** 0.102** 0.107** 25.38*** 
(0.0247) (0.0549) (0.0523) (0.0297) (0.0285) (0.0403) (0.0396) (0.0460) (0.0452) (8.735) 
Average January 
temperature 
0.00562*** 0.00587 0.00650 0.00618* 0.00609* 0.00572* 0.00643* 0.00702** 0.00746** 0.869*** 
(0.00199) (0.00446) (0.00447) (0.00321) (0.00316) (0.00317) (0.00336) (0.00333) (0.00358) (0.215) 
Share plains 0.0231 0.0822 0.0885* 0.0230 0.0234 0.0616* 0.0560 0.0806* 0.0724* -7.116 
(0.0164) (0.0532) (0.0524) (0.0203) (0.0180) (0.0344) (0.0348) (0.0433) (0.0423) (4.395) 
Population density in 1880 120*** 107*** 121*** 59*** 56*** 98*** 109*** 96*** 109*** 40,200*** 
(10.8) (24.8) (24.6) (16) (15.4) (16.1) (16.7) (19.4) (19.9) (3300) 
Other controls and constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.584 0.245 0.278 0.383 0.365 0.322 0.356 0.328 0.356 0.737 
 PANEL B: Second-stage / Dependent variable: WRLURI / TSLS 
Share developed residential 
land (SDL) 
2.913*** 2.483*** 2.287*** 2.383*** 2.439*** 2.313*** 2.145*** 1.896*** 1.808*** 0.0217*** 
(0.886) (0.865) (0.749) (0.823) (0.824) (0.765) (0.708) (0.598) (0.577) (0.00751) 
Homeownership rate (HOR) 0.923 3.465 2.767 2.129 1.913 -0.337 -0.562 -0.0288 -0.476 -0.802 
(3.757) (3.433) (3.578) (3.607) (3.640) (3.850) (3.903) (3.714) (3.901) (4.684) 
Population density in 
developed residential area 
-177.7 -42.97 -62.53 -22.25 -22.52 -137.6 -148.5 -97.10 -121.7 -590.5* 
(214.5) (198.5) (202.5) (178.5) (179.5) (201.8) (205.8) (190.4) (201.3) (350.4) 
Share democratic votes 0.0523*** 0.0519** 0.0489** 0.0511*** 0.0484*** 0.0461** 0.0433** 0.0496*** 0.0458** 0.0577** 
(0.0180) (0.0209) (0.0202) (0.0192) (0.0186) (0.0185) (0.0185) (0.0192) (0.0194) (0.0242) 
Other controls and constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Kleibergen-Paap statistic 2.0 2.1 2.0 2.4 2.4 1.9 1.8 2.0 1.9 1.4 
 PANEL C: Second-stage / Dependent variable: WRLURI / LIML 
Share developed residential 
land (SDL) 
3.177** 2.671** 2.481*** 2.494** 2.567** 2.540** 2.407** 2.079*** 2.013*** 0.0267** 
(1.241) (1.044) (0.937) (1.115) (1.152) (1.007) (1.016) (0.759) (0.779) (0.0115) 
Homeownership rate (HOR) 0.323 3.497 2.665 2.710 2.388 -1.101 -1.631 -0.709 -1.431 -2.620 
(5.641) (3.917) (4.276) (5.573) (5.805) (5.007) (5.496) (4.890) (5.376) (6.735) 
Population density in 
developed residential area 
-232.7 -59.04 -86.54 -2.614 -8.636 -189.9 -219.6 -142.4 -183.0 -809.3 
(341.1) (233.6) (251.2) (296.4) (308.3) (270.7) (301.6) (257.1) (285.9) (553.4) 
Share democratic votes 0.0540*** 0.0534** 0.0503** 0.0523*** 0.0495*** 0.0474** 0.0445** 0.0512*** 0.0472** 0.0632** 
(0.0183) (0.0214) (0.0206) (0.0199) (0.0190) (0.0187) (0.0187) (0.0195) (0.0198) (0.0284) 
Other controls and constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Kleibergen-Paap statistic 2.0 2.1 2.0 2.4 2.4 1.9 1.8 2.0 1.9 1.4 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (observations are clustered by US state). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bold coefficients are instrumented. 
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Table U4  (not intended for publication) 
Replicate Table 7 with reduced set of (statistically significant) excluded instruments (N=81) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
PANEL A: First-stage and second-stage results (Explaining restrictiveness of land use regulation) 
OLS (First-stage) TSLS LIML TSLS LIML 
Dependent variables:: SDL 76 SDL 76 HOR 80 SAKS Regulatory Index 
Share developed residential land, 1976 (SDL 76)    7.015*** 7.091*** 6.620*** 6.628*** 
   (1.533) (1.555) (1.535) (1.537) 
Homeownership rate, 1980 (HOR 80) -0.0958   -0.685 -0.667 -2.419 -2.419 
(0.142)   (2.043) (2.052) (2.303) (2.304) 
Population density in developed residential area (POPD), 1980 0.141 3.469 -9.679 -30.91 -32.81 -74.58 -74.83 
(12.40) (13.31) (7.386) (130.3) (130.7) (139.6) (139.7) 
Share democratic votes in state, average 1972 and 1976 -0.00266 -0.00182 -0.00307** 0.0250 0.0253 0.0145 0.0145 
(0.00277) (0.00277) (0.00133) (0.0299) (0.0299) (0.0299) (0.0299) 
Household wage (in thousand US dollar), 1980 0.0117*** 0.0132*** 0.000599 -0.0210 -0.0213 -0.0266 -0.0267 
(0.00313) (0.00257) (0.00330) (0.0418) (0.0419) (0.0410) (0.0410) 
Average January temperature 0.00576*** 0.00543*** -0.00228**     
(0.00162) (0.00179) (0.00100)     
Population density in 1880 412*** 453*** -312***     
(104) (85.3) (71)     
Share married and no children  0.235 1.151***     
 (0.242) (0.292)     
Other controls and constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.301 0.303 0.631     
Kleibergen-Paap statistic    5.0 5.0 3.9 3.9 
    PANEL B: Explaining growth rate in housing supply 
Dependent variable::    Percent change in housing units 1990 to 2000 
Predicted Saks-Index of Housing Supply Regulation    -0.0316*** -0.0314*** -0.0296** -0.0296*** 
   (0.0107) (0.0111) (0.0124) (0.0115) 
Percent change, housing units, 1980-1990    0.365*** 0.365*** 0.362*** 0.362*** 
   (0.0818) (0.0814) (0.0873) (0.0853) 
Housing units (in million units), 1990     2.75e-09 2.73e-09 1.48e-09 1.48e-09 
   (1.22e-08) (1.33e-08) (1.35e-08) (1.29e-08) 
Constant    0.0580*** 0.0580*** 0.0595*** 0.0595*** 
   (0.0186) (0.0193) (0.0195) (0.0185) 
Adjusted R-squared    0.461 0.461 0.451 0.451 
Notes for both Panels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bold coefficients are instrumented. Notes for Panel A: Robust standard errors in parentheses (obs. are clustered by US state). 
Region fixed effects and constant included (yes). Notes for Panel B: Standard errors are (robust) bootstrap standard errors (using 1000 bootstrap replications and clustering by US state.) 
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Table U5  (not intended for publication) 
Robustness check: Findings for ‘contemporaneous’ and ‘70s/80s’ specifications  
restricted to joint sample of metropolitan areas (N=63) 
 
 First-stage OLS Second-stage  TSLS LIML 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PANEL A 
Dependent variables: SDL WRLURI, 2005 
Share developed, 1992 (SDL)  1.979*** 3.565*** 4.677** 
 (0.611) (0.977) (1.821) 
Homeownership rate, 1990 (HOR)  0.593 2.408 3.537 
 (1.183) (1.867) (2.367) 
Population density in developed area, 1990 
(POPD) 
23.80** -19.54 -11.29 -11.55 
(11.63) (94.60) (125.7) (153.2) 
Share democratic votes in state,  
average 1988 and 1992 
-0.00504* 0.0257 0.0382* 0.0468** 
(0.00264) (0.0231) (0.0206) (0.0219) 
Household wage (in thousand US dollar),  
1990   
0.00263 0.0248 0.0259 0.0265 
(0.00155) (0.0178) (0.0181) (0.0201) 
Major border with coast 0.0831**    
(0.0359)    
Average January temperature 0.00500**    
(0.00200)    
Share plains 0.0567**    
(0.0263)    
Population density in 1880 42    
(145)    
Share married and no children -0.112    
(0.423)    
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.0709 -2.826* -4.859*** -6.161*** 
(0.226) (1.626) (1.854) (2.383) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.451 0.315   
Kleibergen-Paap-statistic   4.4 4.4 
PANEL B 
Dependent variables: SDL SAKS, late 70s/early 80s 
Share developed, 1976 (SDL 76)  2.362*** 6.911*** 10.16*** 
 (0.653) (1.548) (3.798) 
Homeownership rate, 1980 (HOR 80)  -3.406** -1.207 1.262 
 (1.571) (3.166) (4.124) 
Population density in developed area, 1980 
(POPD 80) 
-5.112 -34.94 -87.86 -89.41 
(21.74) (76.32) (145.4) (213.0) 
Share democratic votes in state, average 1972 
and 1976 
-0.00202 0.00159 0.0212 0.0395 
(0.00316) (0.0312) (0.0264) (0.0305) 
Household wage (in thousand US dollar),  
1980   
0.000291 -0.0250 0.0116 0.0452 
(0.00480) (0.0576) (0.0605) (0.0694) 
Major border with coast 0.0520*    
(0.0296)    
Average January temperature 0.00440**    
(0.00198)    
Share plains 0.0421    
(0.0480)    
Population density in 1880 266    
(165)    
Share married and no children -0.852    
(0.774)    
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.278 2.123 -1.195 -4.573 
(0.275) (2.248) (3.800) (5.113) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.295 0.270   
Kleibergen-Paap-statistic   1.8 1.8 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (observations are clustered by US state). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Bold coefficients are instrumented. 
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Table U6  (not intended for publication) 
Additional robustness checks: Remove Californian metro areas, New York City, or both 
 
 Exclude CA Exclude NYC Exclude CA and NYC 
 PANEL A: First-stage / Dependent variable: Share developed land 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Major border with coast  0.0787***   0.0770***   0.0727***  
 (0.0260)   (0.0203)   (0.0252)  
Average January temperature  0.00636***   0.00542***   0.00620**  
 (0.00227)   (0.00181)   (0.00234)  
Share plains  0.0160   0.0191   0.0166  
 (0.0175)   (0.0148)   (0.0181)  
Population density in 1880  108***   137***   136***  
 (25.3)   (21.8)   (32.1)  
Share married and no children  0.0820   -0.143   0.0917  
 (0.333)   (0.349)   (0.322)  
Other controls and constant  Yes   Yes   Yes  
Observations  82   92   81  
Adjusted R-squared  0.621   0.582   0.614  
 PANEL B: Second-stage / Dependent variable: WRLURI 
 OLS TSLS LIML OLS TSLS LIML OLS TSLS LIML 
Share developed residential land 
(SDL) 
2.336*** 2.841*** 2.955*** 1.981*** 2.395*** 2.490** 2.332*** 2.924*** 3.042*** 
(0.483) (0.988) (1.073) (0.510) (0.924) (1.001) (0.481) (1.017) (1.104) 
Homeownership rate (HOR) 0.976 4.817* 5.584* 0.598 3.978** 4.448** 0.900 5.466*** 6.039*** 
(1.085) (2.595) (2.990) (1.026) (1.984) (2.145) (1.197) (2.025) (2.205) 
Population density in developed 
residential area (POPD) 
-31.86 76.94 98.08 -48.43 30.62 39.86 -29.04 75.04 86.22 
(82.91) (103.3) (111.5) (77.95) (87.93) (89.60) (89.16) (83.66) (83.78) 
Share democratic votes 0.0475** 0.0531*** 0.0543*** 0.0429** 0.0462** 0.0469** 0.0477** 0.0527*** 0.0536** 
(0.0189) (0.0196) (0.0203) (0.0198) (0.0199) (0.0202) (0.0191) (0.0204) (0.0209) 
Other controls and constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 82 82 82 92 92 92 81 81 81 
Adjusted R-squared 0.369   0.372   0.362   
Kleibergen-Paap statistic  4.9 4.9  5.2 5.2  4.9 4.9 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (observations are clustered by US state). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bold coefficients are instrumented.
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Table U7  (not intended for publication) 
Additional robustness checks: Add interaction ‘share democratic voters’ x household wage and 
drop variable ‘share democratic voters’ (N=93) 
 
 Add interaction SDV x wage Drop variable ‘share democratic voters’ 
 PANEL A: First-stage / Dependent variable: Share developed land 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Major border with coast  0.0797***   0.0784***  
 (0.0224)   (0.0216)  
Average January temperature  0.00519**   0.00541***  
 (0.00197)   (0.00190)  
Share plains  0.0219   0.0262*  
 (0.0141)   (0.0134)  
Population density in 1880  114***   117***  
 (23.7)   (20.7)  
Share married and no children  -0.175   -0.116  
 (0.409)   (0.342)  
Other controls and constant  Yes   Yes  
Adjusted R-squared  0.582   0.586  
 PANEL B: Second-stage / Dependent variable: WRLURI 
 OLS TSLS LIML OLS TSLS LIML 
Share developed residential 
land (SDL) 
2.039*** 2.609** 2.812** 1.571*** 1.699* 1.740* 
(0.496) (1.060) (1.209) (0.543) (0.949) (1.012) 
Homeownership rate (HOR) 0.803 4.421 5.438 0.307 3.437 4.009 
(1.016) (2.768) (3.366) (1.170) (2.243) (2.508) 
Population density in developed 
residential area (POPD) 
-38.75 70.30 99.07 -37.93 63.27 80.97 
(79.19) (115.0) (129.6) (85.62) (105.4) (112.6) 
Share democratic votes 0.0897 0.201 0.234*    
(0.115) (0.127) (0.142)    
Share democratic votes x 
household wage 
-0.00154 -0.00509 -0.00612    
(0.00370) (0.00405) (0.00449)    
Household wage  
 
0.0938 0.277 0.329    
(0.189) (0.207) (0.231)    
Other controls and constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.371   0.326   
Kleibergen-Paap statistic  3.4 3.4  6.4 6.4 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (observations are clustered by US state). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Bold coefficients are instrumented. 
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Table U8  (not intended for publication) 
Quantitative effects 
 
 Relative change in land scarcity 
(Change in percent) 
Absolute change in land scarcity 
(Change in percentage points) 
 Effect of major access to coast line 
Table 2 (3) +65.2% +8.1% 
 Effect of one std. dev. increase in January temperature 
Table 2 (3) +52.7% +6.5% 
 Effect of one std. dev. increase in ‘share plains’ 
Table 2 (3) +7.7% +0.95% 
 Effect of one std. dev. increase in historic population density 
Table 2 (3) +44.3% +5.5% 
 Effect of increase of share developed land by one standard deviation  
(+12.2 / +10.4 percentage points) on regulatory restrictiveness 
 Change in regulatory index Change in rank order 
Table 2 (1) (OLS) +0.24  47  37 
Table 2 (6) (TSLS) +0.26   47  36 
Table 2 (7) (LIML) +0.27  47  36 
Table 4 (4) (TSLS) +0.35  47  33 
Table 4 (5) (LIML) +0.38  47  31 
Table 7A (6) (TSLS) +0.67  41  21 
Table 7A (7) (LIML) +0.71  41  20 
 Effect of an increase in the homeownership rate by one standard deviation  
(+7.0 / +7.4 percentage points) on regulatory restrictiveness 
 Change in regulatory index Change in rank order 
Table 2 (1) (OLS) (+0.042)  (47  46)  
Table 2 (6) (TSLS) (+0.26)  (47  36)  
Table 2 (7) (LIML) (+0.30)  (47  35)  
Table 4 (4) (TSLS) (+0.043)  (47  46)  
Table 4 (5) (LIML) (-0.013)  (47 - unchanged)  
Table 7A (6) (TSLS) (-0.23)  (41  50)  
Table 7A (7) (LIML) (-0.23)  (41  50)  
 Effect of increase in predicted regulatory index (SAKS) by one standard deviation 
(+1.0) on the growth rate of housing supply 
 Change in the growth rate of housing 
supply between 1990 and 2000 
(Change in percentage points) 
Change in rank order 
 
Table 7B (6) -2.8% 41  54 
Table 7B (7) -2.7% 41  54 
Notes: The marginal effects are measured at the means of the independent variables. The marginal effect of 
having major access to a coast is measured for an MSA that does not have major access to a coast compared to 
one that has access. The change in rank order is calculated for the MSA with the median regulatory index and 
the median growth rate, respectively.  Effect is not statistically significant.  Effect is only marginally 
statistically significant. 
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Appendix C. Multinomial logit discrete choice model (not intended for 
publication) 
In this appendix we replace the multinomial uniform discrete choice model of section 3 by the 
multinomial logit (MNL) discrete choice model. The aim is to show that the theoretical 
predictions of Proposition 2 also hold in this case. 
We replace (2) by 
( ) ln ( )j j ju h V h   
and assume that the j’s are iid distributed according to the double exponential distribution with 
dispersion parameter . As a result, we replace (2) by 
 
 
exp ln /
exp ln /
j
j
k
k
V
f
V



  .           (21) 
Simplifying (21) yields 
1/
1/
j
j
k
k
V
f
V



  . 
The determinants of Vj are the same as in the model of Section 3. The equilibrium condition (6) 
can now be rewritten as  
 
 
1/
1/:
j j jj j
j
k k k
k
t HH H
j f
H H t H


 
 

        .       (22) 
That is, the fraction of people living in j is increasing in the well-being net of the regulatory tax 
of j and decreasing in the well-being net of regulatory tax of cities k≠ j. It follows from (22) that 
the most desirable locations have a larger than average population. To see this, substitute the 
variables pertaining to location j in (22) by the corresponding averages and take the ratio of the 
two to get:  
 
 
1/
1/
j j jj t HH
H t H


 
 
     
which implies (i) j j jt t H H       and (ii) given H , d / d( ) 0j j jH t   . Together, 
these in turn imply j j jH H t t      , as was to be shown. 
53
    
The spatial equilibrium exists and is unique; the method of proof is equivalent to the one of 
Proposition 1 in the main text. 
In order to obtain closed form solutions for both jH  and Vj, let us next normalize the variance of 
j so that  = 1. In this case, solving (22) for Hj and plugging the outcome into (5) yields: 
 , 1j j j j j jH t HV tH t t           .       (23) 
Planning boards maximize (9) non-cooperatively, anticipating (23). The first order conditions that 
solve this program and replace (12) can be written implicitly as ( j  ):  
   
0 0
0 00 0
max 0,
/
j
j j j
t t H
V t Ht t J
 
  
         
 
where 0jV  is the level of welfare (23) evaluated at the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE).  
Finally, replacing assumption (16) by / 2H  , one can show that the set  00 : 0jj t    is 
not empty and, using the same method of proof as for Proposition 2 in the main text, one can 
show that the properties of the SPE are qualitatively identical in the MNL model to the ones of 
the multinomial uniform model, as was to be shown.  
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